Random selection is necessary to create stable meritocratic institutions

What “sortition” is and why it’s proposed

• Commenters note the idea is long‑studied under “sortition”/“demarchy”: offices filled by lottery rather than election.
• Motivation: elections systematically select for charisma, money, and sociopathy rather than public‑spirited competence; lobbying and staffers/lawyers effectively write laws.
• Randomly selected citizens are argued to be more representative and less corruptible, since they don’t need to fundraise or seek reelection.

Arguments in favor of sortition or partial sortition

• Juries and citizens’ assemblies (Ireland, France, local experiments) are cited as proof that random citizens can deliberate, absorb expert input, and reach nuanced, workable recommendations.
• Several propose hybrid systems:
  • Randomly selected lower or upper houses, or a fixed fraction of seats filled by lottery.
  • Policy‑specific “citizen juries” that vet, amend, or approve legislation.
  • “Election by jury” where a random panel interviews and chooses between candidates.
• Others suggest expanding legislatures (e.g., US House) and filling some of the new seats by sortition to dilute partisanship and money.

Design variants and safeguards

• Ideas include:
  • Eligibility pools (basic education, clean record, prior local service).
  • Training periods and good pay to make service attractive and feasible.
  • Stratified sampling or quotas to ensure demographic balance.
• These proposals draw criticism: eligibility tests risk recreating Jim‑Crow‑style exclusion or being captured by existing elites.

Objections and perceived failure modes

• Fear of “randos” writing law; lawmaking is seen as more complex and gameable than jury decisions.
• Concern that power would simply shift to unelected staff, experts, and lobbyists, as with term limits.
• Juries themselves are criticized as biased and manipulable; some prefer professional judges or mixed panels.
• Sortition‑based bodies can be steered by facilitators/secretariats, as alleged in Irish and French examples.

Meritocracy, metrics, and alternatives

• Thread debates whether meritocracy is achievable or just money/elite reproduction in disguise; Campbell/Goodhart’s laws are invoked (metrics get gamed).
• Some see “meritocracy” mainly as a way to stop elites kicking away ladders; others say the word now masks entrenched privilege.
• Direct or “liquid” electronic democracy is floated but criticized for rational ignorance, agenda control, and Californian‑style proposition failures.
• Many conclude some mix of qualification, randomness, and structural reforms (campaign finance, voting systems, institutional design) is needed; no consensus on how far to push sortition.