Oakland cops gave ICE license plate data; SFPD also illegally shared with feds

Flock Safety, YC, and surveillance capitalism

• Many see Flock as purpose‑built for mass surveillance and inter‑agency data sharing, not just “crime prevention.”
• Criticism extends to its VC/YC roots: profit- and founder-first culture, weak ethical constraints, and marketing claims like “eliminate crime.”
• A former employee describes a literal “eliminate all crime” mindset, misleading transparency pages, and aggressive cross‑agency sharing.
• Activists describe local campaigns to block deployments and map camera locations (e.g., community-led inventories and teardowns).

Legality of data sharing (SB 34, SB 54, supremacy clause)

• Commenters dig into California’s SB 34: AG guidance says ALPR data may not be shared with private, out‑of‑state, or federal agencies, regardless of use case.
• Some initially confuse SB 34 (ALPR) with SB 54 (sanctuary law) and argue sharing is only barred for immigration enforcement; others rebut with statute/AG text.
• Debate over whether Oakland PD itself broke the law vs. other California agencies that queried Oakland’s Flock data “on behalf of” ICE/FBI and then relayed results.
• Supremacy‑clause arguments (“federal law > state law”) are countered with the anti‑commandeering doctrine: states can’t be forced to enforce federal law and may prohibit local cooperation.

Who is responsible: builders vs users vs law

• One camp: blame law enforcement; this misuse was predictable and explicitly illegal.
• Another: blame those who created/approved the dataset and ignored predictable abuse; once such systems exist they will be repurposed.
• A third view: both are culpable; you must design for abuse resistance and also prosecute misuse. Existing CA law is civil, with weak, individualized remedies and no real deterrent.

Policing, impunity, and the “defund” / reform debate

• Long subthread on police behavior: qualified immunity, DAs reluctant to prosecute cops, unions and informal “strikes” or “quiet quitting.”
• Disagreement over whether “defund the police” was actually tried; some cite modest budget trims and bail reform, others say police budgets mostly rose and cops simply refused to do their jobs.
• Several argue the only proven lever is changing incentives, rebooting departments, and imposing real consequences, not just passing new rules.

Immigration enforcement and civil liberties

• Strong disagreement over ICE: from “just enforcing duly enacted, harsh laws” to descriptions of dragnet operations, racial targeting, revocation of status without due process, and deportations to abusive foreign prisons.
• Some defend tracking vehicles of undocumented immigrants; others stress false positives, political targeting, and the ease of repurposing such data against legal immigrants, minorities, or dissidents.
• Nazi comparisons are contested: some see clear historical rhymes in data‑driven targeting and deportation; others call that trivializing the Holocaust.

Data collection, privacy, and historical parallels

• Recurrent theme: once large-scale personal datasets exist (ALPR, DNA, phone, payments), they will be reused—often beyond original scope—and become magnets for abuse and breaches.
• Historical examples cited: Nazi use of registries and IBM tabulating systems; Dutch debates over the civil registry; modern DNA and commercial datasets later opened to law enforcement.
• Some push for radical data minimization and strong consent-based privacy law; others argue you can’t “defang” the state with paper rules—rights require continuous political engagement.

Local crime vs civil liberties in Oakland

• Oakland residents describe extremely high rates of car thefts, home-invasion style robberies, and armed crews using stolen cars—often gone before 911 can respond.
• Some report Flock cameras materially help identify and arrest repeat offenders (similar claims made for SF drones), and see them as one of the few working tools.
• Others argue the same tech is quickly diverted to ICE and federal task forces, and that local quality-of-life concerns are being leveraged to normalize a broader surveillance and deportation regime.