Ukrainian hackers destroyed the IT infrastructure of Russian drone manufacturer

Impact of Destroying IT Infrastructure on Manufacturing

• Multiple anecdotes claim factories can limp along or even run primarily on paper, Excel printouts, and local knowledge when ERP/IT systems fail, sometimes for years.
• Others counter that once a plant is fully digitized and staff no longer know pre‑IT workflows, reverting to manual is hard, especially with complex orders and workflows.
• Several stories highlight botched SAP/ERP rollouts that froze procurement or production for months, suggesting fragility rather than resilience.
• Consensus: IT loss is a major disruption but not necessarily a total production stop, depending on how automated and complex the operation is.

Russian Technological Capacity and Resilience

• Some argue Russia is “a decade behind”: weak domestic chip design/production, reliance on smuggled Western components (e.g., Nvidia), and limited globally competitive software.
• Others rebut that Russia has homegrown office/CAD tools, strong math/CS education for many, robust software culture, and advanced e‑government and payment systems.
• There is broad agreement that Russia has proved more economically and militarily resilient than many early‑war Western predictions.

Geopolitics, War Progress, and “Who’s Winning”

• Long subthread debates whether sanctions and the war have weakened Russia or strengthened its military industry and political position.
• One side: Russia has huge casualties, brain drain, depleted stockpiles, demographic decline, lost influence, and long‑term economic damage.
• Other side: GDP and employment have held up, import substitution and Chinese support mitigate sanctions, and Russia is gaining combat experience and some territory.
• Europe’s energy costs, defense spending, and political destabilization are also discussed; views diverge on whether Europe or Russia is worse off.

Attribution, Propaganda, and Reliability of the Report

• Some call the article unverified Ukrainian propaganda; others note lack of immediate independent corroboration is normal for covert cyber ops.
• A translated hacker statement claims: full compromise of Gaskar’s network, 47 TB wiped (including backups), 250+ hosts erased, MikroTik devices bricked, and Chinese UAV tech exfiltrated, plus employee doxxing.
• Commenters note Ukraine and Russia both run information campaigns; earlier myths (e.g., “Ghost of Kyiv”) are cited as reasons for skepticism, though not specific to this incident.

Cybersecurity, Backups, and Disaster Recovery

• Many comments emphasize how rare it is for organizations to practice true “black start” recovery from total loss.
• Cyclic dependencies (SSO, config systems, infra tools) make fresh bootstrapping extremely hard; even small home labs are painful to rebuild.
• Recommended practices: 3‑2‑1 backups, offline/offsite copies, written “rebuild from zero” runbooks, regular DR drills, and infra‑as‑code, though cost and culture often prevent real implementation.

Alternative Cyber Tactics and Drone Warfare

• Some wish for subtle supply‑chain/firmware backdoors in drones instead of blunt destruction, citing Stuxnet‑style, delayed effects.
• Others argue with daily drone strikes on civilians, immediate factory disruption is higher priority and simpler than hard‑to‑hide firmware sabotage.
• Several threads zoom out: cheap FPV and long‑range drones are seen as the signature technology of this war, driving rapid evolution in offense, defense, and cyber‑physical targeting.