Tell HN: Notion Desktop is monitoring your audio and network

Privacy concerns and monitoring behavior

  • Many commenters find the idea of a note-taking app watching microphone and “network ports” inherently creepy and disproportionate to its purpose.
  • People worry about highly sensitive audio potentially being captured, habits inferred from microphone usage, and the possibility of data eventually being sold or repurposed (even if not today).
  • Several draw a distinction between:
    • Local-only detection of activity for UX, vs.
    • Exfiltrating raw data or detailed usage logs to servers.
  • Some argue that even local monitoring of meetings without explicit, up-front consent is unethical and erodes trust.

Notion’s explanation of the feature

  • Company employees explain:
    • Audio recording only occurs when users explicitly start “AI Meeting Notes”.
    • For desktop “meeting detection” notifications, the app detects that some process is using the microphone and matches process names (Zoom, etc.); it does not inspect audio.
    • They state there is no network traffic monitoring or port analysis; earlier support wording was called a misunderstanding.
    • Users can disable “Desktop meeting detection notifications” in settings, but it ships enabled by default.
  • On macOS, microphone usage would be visible via OS indicators; commenters note they haven’t seen Notion active there except when explicitly recording.

Opt-in vs opt-out and trust

  • The biggest flashpoint is that meeting detection is opt-out:
    • Employee admits PMs avoid opt-in because features then see very low usage.
    • Many argue this is precisely why privacy-sensitive features must be opt-in, with clear, contextual explanation.
  • Some suggest better patterns: first-launch privacy screens, inline “this feature needs X, enable?” prompts, or at least a one-time “turn this off” button.
  • A few defend the implementation as a common, benign pattern (similar to other “meeting-aware” apps), saying the outrage is disproportionate.

Platform, sandboxing, and OS behavior

  • Multiple commenters say they avoid native/Electron wrappers altogether, preferring browser use (especially on Linux) to reduce permission surface.
  • There’s discussion of macOS’s “Local Network” permission:
    • Local-network prompts are often triggered by Electron/Chromium defaults (mDNS, WebRTC) and do not equate to packet sniffing.
    • True packet inspection still requires more privileged APIs.
  • Others note that non-sandboxed desktop apps can still inspect open file descriptors and see which processes use the mic or sockets.

Alternatives and product tradeoffs

  • Several users love Notion’s information architecture and collaboration but hate its performance and now question its privacy posture.
  • Numerous alternatives are discussed (Obsidian-based setups, Anytype, Loop, Affine, NocoDB, Docmost, XWiki/Nextcloud/wiki.js, etc.), with tradeoffs around UX, database features, multiplayer, and self-hosting.
  • Some advocate contributing to open-source tools instead of building yet another proprietary system, and call for Notion to offer end-to-end encryption or open-source clients to rebuild trust.