Cops say criminals use a Google Pixel with GrapheneOS – I say that's freedom

Privacy, rights, and the “nothing to hide” trope

• Many commenters reject the idea that only criminals need privacy; privacy is framed as a precondition for democracy, free speech, and healthy personal relationships.
• “Nothing to hide” is criticized as both dishonest and dangerous: laws change, authorities can be corrupt, and you also hold other people’s private data (contacts, messages, photos).
• Some argue it’s acceptable—and even healthy—for some “criminal” behavior to evade total enforcement, since many historically beneficial acts were once illegal.

Policing, profiling, and surveillance logic

• Core worry: treating privacy-seeking (GrapheneOS, encrypted messaging) as inherent suspicion blurs the line between legitimate security work and mass surveillance.
• People note that once surveillance infrastructure exists, it’s routinely abused, from petty vendettas to political repression; Snowden and Pegasus are cited as examples of systemic overreach.
• Others counter that if, in a specific region, Pixel/GrapheneOS usage is heavily overrepresented among serious criminals, using that as one profiling signal is statistically rational—though still civil-liberties‑risky.

European policy and anti-privacy drift

• Strong criticism of EU moves like “ChatControl” and broader anti-encryption trends; these are seen as backdoor mandates sold as child-protection but enabling cross-border political persecution.
• Several comments describe mail-opening laws, drug-war justifications, and cooperation with US intelligence as evidence that privacy protections are being quietly dismantled.

Technology neutrality and “tools for criminals”

• Recurrent analogy: banning or stigmatizing privacy tools (GrapheneOS, mixers, encryption) because criminals use them is like banning knives, fridges, or cash.
• Debate around Roman Storm / Tornado Cash: some view it as a neutral privacy tool unfairly criminalized; others say operating a live mixing service is closer to active participation in money laundering.

GrapheneOS, hardware, and alternatives

• Many users report positive experiences with GrapheneOS and see police hostility as validation that it meaningfully raises the bar for investigations.
• Strong consensus that only Pixels currently meet GrapheneOS’ security requirements (secure element, update cadence, relockable bootloader without blowing fuses). Fairphone and similar devices are called “repairable but insecure” due to missing secure elements and slow patching.
• Some are put off by GrapheneOS’ public relations style, describing the project as technically excellent but socially combative toward other privacy projects.

Trust, baseband, and “honeypot” worries

• A minority argue that as long as the modem/baseband and firmware are closed, any mobile OS offers only partial protection; the stack ultimately serves vendors and possibly state actors.
• Others respond that open source plus verifiable builds improve trust, even though you still trust builders unless you compile yourself.

Usability tradeoffs and ecosystem lock-in

• Main practical downside repeatedly mentioned: no Google Pay / NFC payments (by design, due to SafetyNet/Play Integrity). Some banking apps and government attestation schemes also fail.
• Sandboxed Google Play can be used for most apps, but SafetyNet‑dependent functionality remains an issue; users must weigh convenience vs. privacy.

Scope of the original “cops say” claim

• Several point out the entire controversy traces back to a single offhand quote from one Spanish officer in one article, amplified through multiple tech news sites.
• Some see this as overblown clickbait; others argue that even such small signals matter when they normalize equating privacy tools with criminality.