Wikimedia Foundation Challenges UK Online Safety Act Regulations

Call for Blocking the UK vs Compliance

• Some argue the only effective response is mass geoblocking of UK users by most websites, seeing any compliance as betrayal of a “free internet.”
• Others note UK’s market size and severe fines (up to 10% of revenue) make non‑compliance unrealistic; blocking the UK is framed as symbolic but unlikely at scale.
• There’s a recurring view that big tech actually benefits: compliance costs and risk drive users from small forums and independent sites toward large platforms.

Regulatory Capture and Category 1 Status

• Several comments claim the OSA and its categorisation rules function as regulatory capture: established platforms can afford lawyers, compliance, and age‑checks; new entrants and small communities cannot.
• The Wikimedia challenge is narrowly aimed at the “Categorisation Regulations” that could put Wikipedia into Category 1, with its heaviest obligations.
• Some see this as unprincipled “exceptionalism” (asking for special treatment while accepting the regime overall); others say Wikimedia is realistically defending its own operations.
• There’s debate over whether Wikipedia even meets the “content recommender system” test (algorithmic feeds); examples raised include search, the homepage, related articles, and ML‑based moderation tools.

Impact on Small Forums, Wikis, and Blogs

• One side: the Act is already causing community forums to close or consider UK blocks due to legal uncertainty, compliance work (risk assessments, T&Cs, stronger moderation), and fear of personal liability.
• The other side: obligations are “proportionate,” don’t require 24/7 moderation or registration, and for most small sites amount to documenting risks and continuing normal moderation; many closures are seen as overreaction or FUD.

Child Protection vs Surveillance and Control

• Strong disagreement on whether the law genuinely protects children or mainly expands state/corporate surveillance.
• Critics say “think of the children” is a pretext for ID/biometric collection and long‑term censorship tools, with weak data‑protection enforcement.
• Others emphasize real parental difficulty: one unprotected device or a cheap second‑hand phone can bypass parental controls, so purely individual action is insufficient.
• Alternative proposals include OS‑level age flags or HTTP headers (e.g., X‑Age‑Rating / content tags) and better native parental‑control tooling instead of mandatory ID.

VPNs and Future Escalation

• A subthread disputes claims that the government is already “banning VPNs,” tracing those headlines to alarmist media; what exists so far are concerns about VPNs undermining the OSA and talk of reviewing their impact.
• Nonetheless, many commenters anticipate pressure to restrict VPNs or anonymous tools as the next step.

Broader Political and Historical Context

• Historical analogies: past attempts to ban or tightly regulate encryption (UK RIPA, French crypto bans, US export controls) are cited as evidence that governments repeatedly overreach on digital control.
• Some expect that, like earlier misfires, parts of the OSA may prove unworkable and eventually be rolled back—but only after significant damage to small sites and online privacy.