Many countries that said no to ChatControl in 2024 are now undecided

Campaign site & activism criticism

• Several commenters find the linked “act now” site ineffective: it redirects to a personal-branded politician page, offers vague advice like “ask your government,” and lacks country-specific, concrete steps.
• This is used to illustrate a wider problem: modern activism feels like influencer-style self‑promotion where issues are vehicles for personal brands, which undermines trust and “conversion.”

National surveillance expansions (Danish example)

• The leaked EU meeting record is paired with Danish plans for a broad intelligence database combining social media, health, and other data, plus ML pattern detection.
• Critics call it “a machine for generating suspects” and note Denmark’s low crime rates, questioning necessity.
• Supporters argue access will still require warrants and can be logged and audited; opponents retort that similar safeguards are routinely eroded or ignored.

Trust in institutions vs risk of abuse

• One side emphasizes trust in national institutions, legal processes, and the ability to adjust laws later; sees strong oversight as feasible.
• Others cite repeated misuse of surveillance tools, selective enforcement, lighter treatment of powerful offenders, and chilling effects on mental health care, speech, and dissent.
• There’s concern that once data exists it will inevitably be repurposed, including for political aims.

Motivations, lobbying, and EU power structure

• Commenters stress ChatControl/CSAR is framed around fighting CSAM but fits a broader global trend toward mass surveillance and preemptive policing.
• A specific US-based “child protection” tech lobby group is mentioned as a long‑running driver.
• Structural critique: in the EU, the Commission proposes laws, Parliament can’t initiate or easily repeal them, and unelected bodies plus anonymous “high‑level groups” are seen as fertile ground for lobbying.

Encryption, client-side scanning & workarounds

• Proposal is understood as app‑level client-side scanning: messages are analyzed before encryption and reported in cleartext, letting proponents claim “encryption remains.”
• Technically minded users discuss self‑hosting (Matrix/XMPP), GPG, public UNIX boxes, meshnets, and non‑EU clients; others counter that later iterations will push toward OS‑level monitoring and remote attestation.
• Consensus: serious criminals will adapt; mass surveillance mostly hits ordinary users and weakens general privacy.

Democratic fatigue, ratchet effect & alternatives

• Many see a “ratchet”: surveillance bills reappear until they pass; courts can strike them down only slowly; lobbying outlasts citizen opposition.
• There’s extensive frustration with how hard it is for individuals to influence MEPs or ministers versus coordinated, well‑funded corporate and security‑service lobbies.
• Proposed systemic fixes include referenda, stronger constitutional/positive rights to privacy, limits on re‑introducing failed bills, and even direct democracy—but others argue these too are vulnerable to manipulation and gridlock.
• Some express burnout and pessimism, expecting an eventual “boiling frog” slide into a European surveillance state despite recurring public pushback.