US reportedly forcing TSMC to buy 49% stake in Intel to secure tariff relief

US Power, Coercion, and “End of Empire” Feel

• Many see this as open economic extortion: tariffs used as a “stick” to force TSMC into a political transaction, not a market one.
• Several comments frame it as what living through the late stage of an empire looks like: corruption, short‑termism, bullying allies, politicized courts, and weakening soft power.
• Others argue coercion has “worked” for past empires and that US military/market dominance still gives it leverage, at least in the short run.
• Comparisons are drawn to China’s forced joint ventures, with some noting that US rhetoric about “values” and rule of law loses credibility when behaving similarly.

Economics and Feasibility of a 49% Intel Stake

• TSMC’s total assets are roughly in the same order as what a 49% Intel stake plus US fab build‑out would cost; commenters see the number as wildly implausible without US financing or stock tricks.
• Intel is described as asset‑rich but debt‑laden, with weak profits, poor yields on cutting‑edge nodes, and multiple failed turnaround plans.
• A non‑controlling 49% is seen as worst of both worlds: TSMC takes massive financial and political risk without real control, while still scaring its biggest customers.
• Some speculate US would make the stake non‑voting to avoid foreign control, further reducing any business logic.

Strategic / Geopolitical Dimensions

• Core US motive is widely assumed to be tech‑security: keeping leading‑edge capacity onshore in case of a Taiwan crisis, while still ensuring TSMC’s survival.
• Others note that if TSMC seriously transfers know‑how to Intel, US incentive to defend Taiwan may decrease, weakening Taiwan’s position.
• Taiwan/TSMC is portrayed as having little real freedom of choice, caught between US coercion and Chinese threat, with suggestions that nuclear deterrence may be their only true protection.

Tariffs and Who Pays

• Repeated insistence: tariffs are effectively a tax on the importing country; in most cases US consumers or domestic firms pay, not foreigners.
• Some nuance: for patented or monopoly products, exporters may absorb more of the tariff to keep final prices stable, but at the cost of profit.
• Tariffs are also characterized as a de‑facto regressive consumption tax used to fund income‑tax cuts and as a flexible weapon to reward/punish countries and firms.

Industrial Policy and Tech Impact

• Critics argue this is classic “picking winners,” propping up a structurally weak Intel instead of backing the best operators (TSMC, other fabs) directly.
• Others see a theoretical “win‑win”: TSMC gets US fabs and influence at Intel; Intel gets competent process tech; the US diversifies away from a single foreign chokepoint.
• Skeptics respond that Intel’s culture, debt, and technical lag make a clean turnaround unrealistic, and that entangling TSMC may damage global trust in its neutrality.

Legitimacy, Law, and Capitalism

• Many see the move as incompatible with “free markets”: it looks like a protection racket—“buy the failing national champion if you want tariff relief and security guarantees.”
• Analogies appear to Danegeld, TikTok’s forced sale, and historical corporate bailouts: once you pay, more demands follow.
• A minority argues it’s simply a hard‑nosed deal among powerful actors—TSMC can refuse, stall, or sign and never fully follow through, as other regions have done with US demands.