Marines now have an official drone-fighting handbook

Drone capabilities and frontline role

• Small FPV and quadcopter drones are now seen as as indispensable to infantry as rifles and radios, especially in Ukraine, where units without drones are at major disadvantage.
• FPV drones can reach 30–200+ mph; others loiter quietly at 100+ m and drop munitions before being heard.
• Payloads range from grenades to RPG/shaped charges, mortar shells, landmines, and anti-tank mines; some “turtle” tanks reportedly survive dozens of hits.
• Many frontline drones now use kilometers‑long fiber‑optic tethers to resist jamming; fields can end up covered in cable “spiderwebs.”

Shotguns and small-arms vs drones

• Several commenters ask why birdshot/duckshot isn’t the answer; others argue it’s largely impractical: short effective range (~40 m), tiny reaction windows, and highly agile targets.
• There are videos of drones being shot down with shotguns and rifles; both sides reportedly train by shooting at dummy drones/clays. Success is acknowledged but framed as “lucky” and rare under combat stress.
• Under‑barrel 40mm buckshot grenades exist; some ad‑hoc modifications are mentioned but seen as niche.

Other counter‑drone systems and tactics

• Suggested/observed systems: man‑portable SPAAGs, Phalanx‑like guns, Bofors/30mm with proximity fuses (e.g., EOS “Slinger”), interceptor drones, EW, and lasers.
• Trenches with overhead cover, camo nets, dispersion of troops, and movement along treelines are becoming standard survival tactics.
• Flame-throwers and similar ideas are largely dismissed as suicidal at useful ranges.

Psychological and tactical impact

• Drones are described as both lethal and psychologically dominant: soldiers fear them more than small arms or artillery in some reports.
• Constant overhead threat forces troops into static survival postures; “if you hear a drone, you’re already dead” is cited as common belief.
• Others stress drones are not “just psyops”; they account for a large share of kills and can chase soldiers into bunkers, trenches, or buildings.

Economics, mass production, and swarms

• Ukraine is cited as producing millions of cheap expendable drones yearly; some argue drones are now “ammo, not assets.”
• Multiple back‑of‑the‑envelope calculations claim it’s vastly cheaper to kill trained infantry or destroy high‑value materiel (e.g., aircraft) with swarms of $200–$1000 drones than with traditional means.
• Counterpoint: artillery still causes the majority of casualties; drones largely enable better artillery and recon rather than fully replacing traditional fires.
• Debate over swarms: some say true swarms are limited by human piloting; others cite large AI‑assisted or autonomous salvos already in use and under active development.

Autonomy, ethics, and future “murder bots”

• Several predict fully autonomous “murder bots” that seek heat or human features and detonate, potentially acting as mobile mines and area‑denial weapons.
• Concerns are raised about indiscriminate attacks, civilian risk, and erosion of existing norms on war crimes and proportionality; others cynically note rules are often ignored in high‑end wars.

Strategic and doctrinal implications

• Commenters connect Ukraine’s experience to future conflicts (China–Taiwan, Iran–Israel, Pakistan–India), emphasizing that geography and industrial capacity will shape drone utility.
• Some argue US doctrine historically treated drones as expensive recon/strike assets and is lagging behind Ukraine/Russia’s mass‑disposable model.
• The 2020 USMC manual is described as recon‑centric; the new handbook is seen as catching up to a reality where squad‑level airpower and counter‑drone tactics are central to ground combat.