Baltimore Assessments Accidentally Subsidize Blight–and How We Can Fix It

Local context & tax burdens

• Some compare Baltimore to nearby areas (e.g., York County, PA): cheaper homes but higher school taxes over time, suggesting overall cost differences can wash out.
• Others note suburbs often “work” only because they parasitically rely on nearby cities’ economic engines; they’re not sustainable in isolation.

Vacant land, blight & city ownership

• Debate over whether it’s better for the city to end up owning vacant/blighted lots vs. leaving them to rot under private ownership.
• Examples from other cities: development corporations can repurpose underused land for housing and commercial space, but this often leads to gentrification and cronyism.
• Some suggest the city could redistribute seized lots to neighbors, but others doubt any city does this routinely due to administrative complexity and perverse incentives.

Fairness of assessments & ‘market value’

• One camp stresses that Maryland law requires assessment at market value; undervaluing vacant land implicitly shifts tax burden onto improved properties, which is unfair.
• Opponents argue “fair market value” and “similar properties” are inherently fuzzy and political; assessors’ choices are not neutral.
• Clarification: assessments and tax rates are separate; officials can adopt “no new revenue” rates so higher values don’t automatically mean higher total taxes.

Speculation vs. development

• Some argue speculation should be structurally unprofitable; holding idle land creates no social value.
• Others defend speculators as risk absorbers who smooth markets and let builders/farmers specialize.
• Counterpoint: speculators can hoard vacant land and refuse to sell at a loss, visibly blocking productive use.

Land Value Tax (LVT) & Georgism

• Many see LVT/Georgism as fixing perverse incentives: tax land value, not improvements; stop rewarding surface parking and vacant lots in prime locations.
• Critics worry LVT could:
  • Encourage consolidation by large developers.
  • Be regressive for “asset‑rich, cash‑poor” owners (e.g., retirees in gentrifying areas).
  • Rely on manipulable notions like “highest and best use.”
• Supporters reply:
  • Land taxes are generally seen as progressive and hard to evade.
  • Most blighted or vacant land is held by corporations, not “little old grandmas.”
  • LVT can coexist with other taxes; it needn’t be a 100% “single tax.”

Property taxes & improvement disincentives

• Several note that taxing improvements (sheds, decks, additions) discourages upgrades and leads to tarp shelters, trailers, or minimalistic parking lots to dodge appraisal.
• Others say most people don’t consciously manage their lives around this, but developers absolutely do.

Governance, regulation & competence

• Strong thread of distrust: governments are accused of grift, corruption, and using tax policy to serve insiders rather than residents.
• In heavily regulated, mismanaged cities (Baltimore cited repeatedly), commenters doubt tweaks to assessment formulas will overcome deeper issues like crime, bureaucracy, and dysfunctional enforcement.
• Some suggest targeted blight fees or positive incentives, but skeptics say they simply lead to the city owning more unmaintained property.