Australian court finds Apple, Google guilty of being anticompetitive

Scope and Impact of the Australian Ruling

• Commenters see the judgment as a “mixed win” for Epic: anticompetitive conduct found, but no finding of consumer-law breaches or unconscionable conduct.
• A key practical question is what changes in Australia: lower fees, third‑party stores, or mostly symbolic impact. Some expect “most likely nothing” in the short term; others think just allowing the Epic Store on iOS would be huge.
• The 2,000‑page length sparks debate: some see it as evidence of legal overcomplication; others argue complex corporate behavior and extensive evidence require such depth.

Courts, Power, and Complexity

• One thread contrasts how slowly courts move on large corporate cases versus how quickly corporations change tactics; some see this as proof that justice skews toward deep pockets.
• Others argue corporate cases are inherently more complex than “regular joe” cases, while critics say that’s conflating money with legal complexity.
• There is skepticism about judicial independence: some insist judges in countries like Australia and the US are largely insulated from politics; others point to “judge shopping,” corruption, and the behavior of Western elites as counter‑evidence.

Global Antitrust vs US Inaction

• Several comments frame this as part of a broader pattern: antitrust wins coming from EU/Australia rather than the US.
• The EU’s Digital Markets Act and “Brussels effect” are cited as creating clearer, rule‑based constraints compared to US case‑by‑case litigation.
• There’s debate over how aggressive recent US antitrust enforcement has really been: some say the US shows “no willingness”; others counter with recent US cases and blocked mergers, arguing the problem is weak, loophole‑ridden doctrine and hostile courts.

Walled Gardens, Monopolies, and Market Definitions

• Heavy discussion on why Google lost an antitrust case in the US while Apple didn’t, despite iOS being more locked down:
  • One camp: Android was marketed as “open” and then quietly constrained, making Google more vulnerable; Apple has always been explicit about its closed ecosystem.
  • Another camp: iOS’s total control over app distribution is “objectively worse,” so treating Android as the illegal monopoly is perverse.
• People debate what “monopoly” means:
  • Some stress Apple has a de facto monopoly over app distribution on iPhones, which matter because they dominate segments like the US high‑end market.
  • Others say smartphones are a broader market with many alternatives; consoles and other locked platforms have long operated legally as walled gardens.

Payments, the 30% Cut, and Corporate Incentives

• Many see the in‑app payment monopoly and 30% fee as the clearest anticompetitive issue, especially when applied to large companies capable of running their own billing.
• A proposal gains support: certify large “trusted” providers to use their own payment systems at very low platform fees (0–5%) to defuse the strongest antitrust arguments while preserving security and distribution value.
• There’s disagreement on whether public companies are forced to maximize profit at all costs:
  • One side: fiduciary duty and growth pressure mean they can’t voluntarily give up lucrative app‑store revenue; only law can move them.
  • Other side: “must maximize profit” is described as a myth; boards have wide discretion but often choose profit‑maximizing behavior and then blame duty.

Remedies, Penalties, and Future Outlook

• Several commenters argue that if sanctions are limited to “stop doing that,” firms will always push the line; they call for “ruinous” penalties to deter anticompetitive conduct.
• Others are more cynical, expecting narrow, region‑specific fixes and continued “malicious compliance,” such as Apple’s geo‑restricted, loophole‑heavy DMA response in the EU.
• There is a broader concern that the US market may remain the most “abused” while other jurisdictions slowly force fairer behavior, creating a patchwork of rights and experiences for users.