Thai Air Force seals deal for Swedish Gripen jets

Thailand’s Choice and Regional Context

• Commenters link Thailand’s move to being denied F‑35s due to U.S. concerns over its democratic backsliding and closeness to China; if forced into 4th‑gen, Gripen is seen as a logical pick over F‑16.
• The main near-term threats discussed are Cambodia border clashes and Myanmar; against those, any modern fighter would suffice. China is viewed as overwhelming regardless of platform.
• Some note the current deal is only for four aircraft, arguing it’s symbolically important but not transformative for Thailand’s ~100‑plane force.

Perceptions of U.S. Reliability and Foreign Policy

• A dominant theme is that the U.S. has become an unreliable and politically volatile supplier: sanctions, tariffs, arms cutoffs, and potential “remote kill switch” or maintenance leverage are cited as risks.
• Ukraine’s experience after the Budapest Memorandum, as well as U.S. behavior toward Thailand, Cambodia, and others, is used to argue alliances and security guarantees are not trustworthy.
• There’s debate whether this stems from “values-based” democracy promotion vs. pure power politics and hypocrisy, but both critics and realists converge on: buyers now factor U.S. domestic instability into procurement.

Broader Shift Away from U.S. Weapons and F‑35 Issues

• Several European decisions (Spain favoring Eurofighter, Swiss unease with F‑35 costs, Danish regret) are framed as part of a longer-term decoupling from U.S. systems, accelerated by Trump-era bullying and tariffs.
• The F‑35 is described as technologically impressive but expensive, maintenance-heavy, and politically entangling; its “hangar queen” reputation and reduced U.S. orders are noted.
• Switzerland’s fixed-price F‑35 deal and later U.S. price increase are cited as an example of cost and trust friction.

Gripen and Alternative Doctrine

• Gripen is praised for lower operating costs, strong air‑to‑air performance (Meteor missile, low wing loading), and especially for dispersed operations from short road runways with minimal ground support.
• This decentralized basing model is contrasted with large, vulnerable U.S.-style airbases; Ukraine’s drone strikes on Russian airfields are used as evidence that dispersal is increasingly valuable.
• Some highlight that many fighters can technically use roads, but Gripen and Swedish doctrine are built around fast, mobile, hard‑to-target operations.