Secure Boot, TPM and Anti-Cheat Engines

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Push toward attestable PCs and console‑like control

  • Several comments see kernel‑level anti‑cheat + Secure Boot + TPM as turning the general PC into a “trusted console” platform, where software refuses to run outside a narrow, vendor‑approved configuration.
  • Some suspect this indirectly steers people toward consoles or “Windows as Xbox”–style ecosystems and blocks Linux/Proton progress for big online titles.

Effectiveness and limits of Secure Boot/TPM anti‑cheat

  • Supporters argue Secure Boot + TPM + measured boot and remote attestation make client‑side cheating “look like hacking your own machine,” raising the technical bar.
  • With attestation and DMA protection (IOMMU, kernel DMA protection, encrypted memory), DMA cheat hardware becomes harder, though not impossible.
  • Skeptics stress these stacks are complex, buggy, and will always have exploitable holes; you can only make cheating harder, never impossible.

Hardware cheats, tournaments, and economics

  • Discussion of relatively cheap PCIe/M.2 DMA devices and high‑priced private cheats; many note that for top‑level esports prizes, $300–$1k+ is rational.
  • Professional tournaments already tightly control hardware; some argue this is the appropriate place for maximum lock‑down, rather than on every consumer PC.

Driver signing and OS‑level defenses

  • There’s debate on whether cheat authors can still slip malicious drivers through Microsoft’s signing process.
  • Others point out modern Windows kernel protections and stricter driver policies (e.g., banning generic “execute arbitrary user commands” interfaces, address‑space isolation) significantly raise that bar.

Virtualization and VMs

  • QEMU + vTPM is raised as a potential bypass; replies note attestation fails because virtual TPMs lack manufacturer‑signed Endorsement Keys.
  • Passing through a real TPM leaks “extra boot events” and hypervisors are detectable via timing, caches, and other side channels; undetectable VMs are described as “essentially infeasible.”

Server‑side checks vs. invasive anti‑cheat

  • One camp insists proper server‑side validation and player‑run community servers are the real solution, citing older games where local admins banned cheaters.
  • Others respond that at modern scale, IP/account bans are easy to evade, manual moderation burns out volunteers, and full real‑time server validation would wreck latency and playability while still failing to detect human‑assisted aimbots.

Privacy, agency, and surveillance concerns

  • Multiple commenters worry about surrendering deep system control to game vendors, seeing it as part of a broader trend of devices becoming locked‑down surveillance and control platforms.
  • Unique per‑CPU TPM keys and potential hardware‑level bans are seen by some as disproportionate and dangerous, even if technically effective.