US Intel

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Government stake, predictability, and trust

  • Many see the 10% U.S. equity stake as responding to Intel’s implicit threat to stop leading‑edge node development (e.g., beyond 18A), which would leave the U.S. without a domestic advanced fab.
  • A major objection is U.S. policy unpredictability: tariffs, industrial policy, and administration changes make long‑horizon fab investments look politically risky rather than stabilizing.
  • Some argue the equity swap simply retroactively changes CHIPS Act grant terms, looking more like a shakedown or bailout than a coherent strategy.

Industrial policy vs. “ism” labels

  • Commenters debate whether this move is closer to socialism, fascist corporatism, or “state capitalism.”
  • One side frames it as national-security‑driven support for a strategic industry, comparable to defense plants or past interventions (GM, banks).
  • Others see it as merging state and corporate power without clear rules — “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” — raising worries about political meddling and favoritism rather than market competition.

Is Intel too big to fail? Alternatives proposed

  • Broad agreement that leading‑edge fabs are geopolitically critical and extraordinarily capital‑intensive; a true new U.S. competitor is seen as unrealistic.
  • Competing ideas:
    • Use CHIPS‑style subsidies and tax incentives to push Apple/Nvidia/AMD/Broadcom into long‑term foundry contracts with Intel instead of buying equity.
    • Create a government‑owned or consortium‑run fab entity (NASA/DARPA‑style) separate from Intel.
    • Let Intel fail and spin fabs to a new domestic vehicle backed by policy carrots (and sticks) – seen by others as fantasy given scale and risk.

Offshoring, neoliberalism, and strategic dependence

  • Long thread on how financialization, stock buybacks, and chasing cheap foreign manufacturing hollowed out U.S. industry (with Intel and Boeing as case studies).
  • Some defend globalization and comparative advantage, arguing capitalism naturally drives outsourcing and that trying to reverse 50 years of this with tariffs and ad‑hoc bailouts will fail.
  • Others emphasize resilience vs. efficiency: over‑reliance on Taiwan/TSMC for cutting‑edge chips is viewed as a catastrophic tail‑risk the market won’t price correctly.

Talent, culture, and U.S. tech priorities

  • Multiple former semiconductor engineers say they left for software/ML due to far better pay, prestige, and working conditions.
  • Intel is described as bureaucratic, mismanaged, and stockholder‑driven, having missed foundry opportunities and under‑invested relative to TSMC while spending heavily on buybacks.
  • Some think no amount of government equity fixes that; what’s needed is management overhaul, long‑term R&D focus, and better compensation to attract top hardware talent.

China, TSMC, and Taiwan

  • Widespread agreement that China’s rise, domestic chip push, and potential Taiwan conflict are central drivers.
  • Disagreement on how much TSMC truly deters Chinese action, and whether U.S. reliance on Taiwanese fabs is sustainable.
  • Several voices warn that if China eventually matches TSMC, Taiwan’s leverage — and global stability around chips — will erode further.