What is it like to be a bat?
Nature of consciousness and reductionism
- Some see the essay as a critique of strict reductionism: objective physical accounts fail to capture subjective experience (“what it’s like”), but that doesn’t automatically make consciousness metaphysically “special.”
- Others argue Nagel pushes toward rejecting reductionism entirely, which would collapse distinctions between levels (particles vs. consciousness). Critics reply that this misreads him: he’s marking limits, not abolishing levels of description.
- Physicalism vs. alternatives is heavily debated. Pro‑physicalists appeal to neuroscience and interaction problems for dualism; opponents argue that no description of brain states explains why there is any experience rather than none.
The phrase “what it is like”
- A long subthread disputes whether “there is something it is like to be X” is meaningful or just a linguistic trick.
- Defenders say it’s a concise way to pick out subjective experience and distinguish conscious from non‑conscious systems.
- Skeptics claim the term is circular, defined only via equally vague notions (“qualia,” “subjective experience”), and smuggles in dualism.
- Some note that translations into other languages drop the “like”/comparison flavor, suggesting the English phrasing may be rhetorically loaded but not essential.
Animal minds and ethical stakes
- Many assume bats and other mammals are conscious, citing evolutionary continuity and behavioral evidence; a minority question this and push on the lack of a strict definition.
- Discussion touches on whether consciousness requires self‑reflection, or whether simple “what it’s like” experience (pain, hunger, perception) suffices.
- Ethical implications surface: if animals lack subjectivity, almost anything becomes permissible; if they do have it, pain and preference matter morally.
AI, “batfishing,” and p‑zombies
- A proposed term “batfished” means being tricked into ascribing subjectivity to non‑sentient systems (e.g., LLMs). Some like the coinage; others say “anthropomorphizing” already covers this.
- Participants ask whether an LLM run has “something it’s like to be it.” Most are skeptical but note we lack a crisp test, mirroring the bat problem.
- P‑zombies (behaviorally identical but without inner life) and simulation scenarios are invoked to argue both for and against physicalism and for limits of certainty.
Self, free will, and first‑person limits
- Several comments distinguish “raw” experience from meta‑cognition (“knowing that you know”) and debate whether the latter is necessary for consciousness.
- Free will is contested: some tie consciousness to the ability to choose; others argue decisions are fully determined physical processes, with “will” an illusion generated by self‑monitoring brains.
- There’s recurring worry that we can only truly know “what it’s like” to be ourselves right now; even our own past experience is reconstructive and unreliable.
Neuroscience, measurement, and progress
- One side insists we lack even a usable definition of consciousness; others respond that many sciences start with fuzzy targets (dark matter, SIDS) and refine concepts pragmatically.
- Empirical work—brain lesions, anesthesia, blindsight, facial recognition, echolocation training—shows tight links between brain states and reported experience, which physicalists cite as strong (if incomplete) evidence.
- Integrated Information Theory and similar frameworks are mentioned as attempts at quantitative measures, but their status remains contested.
Umwelten and transformed perception
- The concept of “umwelt” (species‑specific experiential world) is extended to human skills: learning Vim, Lisp, Haskell, music theory, or array programming can permanently change what structures we “see” in code or text.
- This is tied back to Nagel: you can’t fully understand another umwelt—bat, blind person, or functional programmer—without partially living it, not just having it described.