Chat Control Must Be Stopped

Definition and Scope of “Chat Control”

• Refers to EU (and similar UK) proposals like the Child Sexual Abuse Regulation (CSAR) requiring providers to scan all user content (messages, email, social media, cloud storage, hosting) for CSAM and other “abusive material.”
• Would explicitly cover end‑to‑end encrypted services by forcing scanning on devices or weakening encryption.
• Several commenters note it’s an umbrella label for a family of proposals, not a single law.

Critiques of the Article and Messaging

• Many readers complain the article takes several paragraphs of alarmism before clearly stating what Chat Control actually is; definition is buried mid‑page.
• Some argue this confusion comes from insiders forgetting that most people have never heard of the term. Clear, calm, upfront explanations and a concise “what it is, why it matters, what to do” structure are requested.

Technical Concerns: E2EE, Client-Side Scanning, Device Control

• Central worry: scanning “including end‑to‑end encrypted ones” means either:
  • scanning before encryption/after decryption on the client, or
  • giving providers keys or backdoors, making E2EE meaningless.
• Fears that mandatory client‑side AI scanners (closed, unauditable) will effectively outlaw secure E2EE and normalize self‑surveillance.
• Concerns about hardware attestation, locked bootloaders, app‑store control and TPM making it impossible to run non‑compliant software (Linux, FOSS clients, self‑hosted tools).
• Some already distrust closed‑source “E2EE” apps for exactly this reason.

Legal, Political, and Institutional Dynamics

• Debate over how “autocratic” the EU is: some call the Commission near‑autocrats; others explain that member states push these laws and that Council and Parliament must approve.
• Some national courts have ruled similar schemes unconstitutional; several countries are opposed, others undecided. Germany’s position is seen as potentially decisive.
• There are claims the law carves out exemptions for “national security” and possibly for officials themselves.
• One cited poll reports 72% of EU citizens oppose scanning all private messages, countering claims that “the public wants this.”

Motivations, Power, and Silence

• Hypotheses for weak opposition by industry and media:
  • Regulatory capture: big tech can afford compliance and gain a moat; smaller providers may be crushed.
  • Fear of being branded “pro‑pedo” for opposing “child protection” measures.
  • Fatigue from decades of recurring surveillance bills under new names.
  • Possible conflicts of interest: outlets rely on surveillance‑driven advertising and/or state support.

Civil Liberties, Scope Creep, and Abuse Risks

• Many see this as equivalent to installing a microphone/camera in everyone’s home; frequent comparisons to 1984 and to China‑style surveillance.
• Strong fear of scope creep: from CSAM to terrorism, extremism, political dissent, copyright enforcement, or “grossly offensive” speech.
• Examples are raised of law enforcement abusing access to databases for stalking or personal vendettas, suggesting similar misuse at larger scale is likely.
• Some argue EU rhetoric on human rights and privacy is belied by persistent attempts to mandate mass scanning.

Effectiveness and Inevitable Evasion

• Widespread view that determined offenders will easily adapt:
  • extra encryption layers (e.g., ZIP with strong passwords),
  • steganography,
  • offline media distribution (USB, discs, postal mail),
  • bespoke tools outside mainstream platforms.
• Thus, dragnet scanning primarily hits ordinary users and creates huge data‑breach and abuse surfaces, while serious criminals move elsewhere.
• Counterpoint from some: authorities can criminalize refusing to decrypt or using “suspicious” tools, but others note this creates its own civil‑liberties crisis.

Responses, Activism, and Coping Strategies

• Suggested political responses: write MEPs; push for constitutional or high‑level protections against mandatory backdoors and client‑side scanning; legally prohibit ID‑for‑access and OS‑level surveillance.
• Some express deep pessimism, arguing that governments re‑introduce such schemes until they pass; others insist defeatism helps them succeed.
• Proposed technical and social coping strategies:
  • decentralization and many small, incompatible protocols/communities;
  • FOSS and self‑hosting, possibly including voluntary CSAM filters under the operator’s control;
  • samizdat‑style distribution and offline communication;
  • abandoning smartphones for simpler devices.
• Skeptics respond that these channels may themselves be banned, locked down, or criminalized, and that most people will choose convenience over privacy.