Germany is not supporting ChatControl – blocking minority secured

ChatControl status and Germany’s role

• Thread centers on news that Germany will not support the EU “ChatControl” (CSAR) proposal, creating a blocking minority under EU voting rules.
• Many see this as a major but temporary victory: the proposal is likely to return in revised form, as past iterations have.
• Several posters note that Germany still discusses “compromises” (e.g., opposing encryption backdoors but not necessarily all scanning), so they see no principled rejection of mass surveillance yet.

On‑device scanning, encryption, and privacy

• Strong consensus that client‑side scanning is incompatible with private communication.
• People argue any system that can detect CSAM can be repurposed to find dissidents, journalists, or other disfavored content.
• Concern that Apple’s abandoned on‑device CSAM plans normalized the concept and gave politicians a concrete model to push.
• Lock‑down of iOS/Android and app‑store control are viewed as the ideal enforcement channel: only “approved” spyware‑compliant apps could run.

Activism, media coverage, and public opinion

• Multiple commenters report writing MPs or using coordinated email tools; response rates are low but sometimes explicitly acknowledge pressure.
• View that individual letters matter less than demonstrating electoral risk, but even small volumes can raise an issue on a politician’s radar.
• Earlier ChatControl rounds were barely covered in some countries; more recent coverage and online discussion are credited with flipping at least one government’s stance.

EU process, blocking minority, and democratic legitimacy

• Several explain the qualified‑majority system: laws need both a majority of states and 65% of EU population; a few large states can block.
• Long subthread debates whether the EU is “actually democratic,” the primacy of EU law over national constitutions, and whether courts would strike down ChatControl.
• Some argue the EU’s multi‑layered structure slows bad laws and can “save us from ourselves”; others see it as distant, lobbyist‑driven, and structurally prone to overreach.

Human rights and legality of mass scanning

• People invoke the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, but note the broad exceptions (national security, crime, “morals”) that could be used to justify scanning.
• There is disagreement on whether privacy should be an absolute right or always balanced via warrants and proportionality.
• Some expect national constitutional courts (e.g., Germany’s) to block indiscriminate scanning; others warn that constitutions can be amended or courts may ultimately defer to EU obligations.

Motivations, lobbying, and “think of the children”

• Widespread belief that “child protection” is being used as a perennial pretext for general surveillance, echoing older cryptography fights (Clipper chip, “Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse”).
• Some point to possible influence from surveillance‑tech vendors and US‑linked NGOs; others insist national governments (notably Denmark and Sweden) are pushing primarily out of their own security/control agendas.
• A minority voice emphasizes that many parents genuinely want tools against online predation, illustrating the political appeal of such measures even if technically dangerous.

Technology vs politics

• One camp argues this is fundamentally a political battle: without shifting public narrative and law, technical fixes reach only a tiny minority and can be criminalized.
• Another camp stresses building resilient, decentralized, end‑to‑end encrypted systems (and even alternative OSes) to make enforcement technically and economically infeasible, as happened with earlier crypto‑export controls.
• Several conclude both tracks are necessary: continuous political resistance plus stronger, widely‑available privacy‑preserving tools.