Danish supermarket chain is setting up "Emergency Stores"

Purpose and Timeframe of “Emergency Stores”

• Clarification that these are normal supermarkets designed to keep operating during crises (power/telecom outages, supply disruptions), not pre-stocked bunkers customers draw from in advance.
• Three days is defended as a realistic target for restoring power/basic logistics, but some argue it’s too short and only modestly increases resilience.

Individual Preparedness vs Community Resilience

• Many note most households only have 2–3 days of food; others, influenced by COVID or religious guidance (e.g. six‑month to one‑year food storage), keep far more.
• Debate over whether deep personal stockpiles make you safer or just a target; counter‑argument: having surplus lets you help neighbors and stabilize the community.
• Emphasis from several commenters on cheap, durable staples (grains, beans, powdered milk, extra water) and alternative cooking/boiling setups.

Panic Buying, Pricing, and Equity

• Widespread expectation that people will panic‑buy regardless, citing COVID and local disasters; just‑in‑time supply chains amplify this.
• Suggestions: rationing/quotas vs high emergency prices. Price‑gouging seen by some as “just economics” and by others as immoral and illegal; concern that high prices primarily harm the poor.

Logistics and Inventory Management

• For stores to hold extra shelf‑stable goods, they must constantly rotate stock out to regular outlets before expiry (FILO/FIFO debate); this is likened to distribution‑center optimization problems.
• Questions about whether these locations differ meaningfully from enlarged warehouses with a retail front.

Payments and Digital Fragility

• Concern that without telecoms, card terminals, mobile payments, and national ID/payment systems (e.g. Denmark’s Nets/MitID, Sweden’s Swish, generally cashless habits) may fail.
• Partial mitigations: offline EMV card auth, Starlink, and keeping cash on hand; some argue cash remains the only offline, third‑party‑free payment despite handling costs.

War, Disasters, and Systemic Risk

• Split views: some see this as prudent given war in Europe, Russian cyber/sabotage threats, climate‑driven disasters, and highly optimized supply chains; others see exaggerated war talk used to justify defense buildup and security theater.
• Comparisons to Finland, Switzerland, Texas’s H‑E‑B, and government emergency stockpiles as models for national‑scale resilience.

Costs, Motives, and CSR

• Skepticism that a private chain will absorb extra cost “just for society”; others frame it as corporate social responsibility, reputational investment, and potential mild marketing opportunism rather than pure profit.