Chat Control faces blocking minority in the EU

Status of Chat Control in the EU process

• Commenters stress that nothing is truly “repelled”: there is currently only a blocking minority, which could vanish if a key country (notably Germany) flips.
• Some criticize the thread title as misleading or “maliciously incorrect” because the proposal is still alive and being negotiated.

Legislative persistence and democratic fatigue

• Many are disturbed that the same or similar mass‑surveillance proposal can be brought back repeatedly until it passes.
• This is framed as a “we must win every time, they only need to win once” dynamic, especially for one‑way surveillance powers that are hard to roll back.
• Others argue repeated attempts are inherent to democracy; many social reforms (e.g. cited: gay marriage, drug legalization) required multiple tries.

Ideas to constrain repeated bills

• Proposals include:
  • Cooling‑off periods or “exponential backoff” after failed votes.
  • Higher thresholds or referendums for controversial rights‑impacting laws.
  • Constitutional or “digital bill of rights” protections against mass surveillance and E2EE bans.
• Counterarguments:
  • Hard to define when two bills are “the same”; easily gamed via small wording changes or “poison pill” bills.
  • Could block desirable reforms if opponents deliberately force an early failed vote.
  • Might entrench conservative outcomes and paralyze legislatures.

Role and limits of courts

• Some expect EU or national courts to strike down indiscriminate scanning as violating fundamental rights, citing prior data‑retention jurisprudence.
• Others warn courts are not reliable safeguards: states often ignore ECHR judgments, and sustained conflict is used politically to weaken courts’ authority.
• There is discussion of rule‑of‑law conditionality (e.g. Poland) versus accusations that the EU punishes “wrong” electoral outcomes.

Motivations behind Chat Control

• Supporters are said to focus on catching child abusers and organized crime, especially in Nordic countries with strong “moral policing” traditions.
• Critics highlight lobbying by NGOs and vendors eager to sell scanning technologies, and the desire to convert a temporary CSAM‑scanning exception into a permanent, broader regime.

Privacy, effectiveness, and abuse risks

• Skeptics argue that:
  • Intelligent criminals will easily evade mandated scanners; dumb ones will adapt with code words.
  • Mass scanning will generate huge false positives and waste law‑enforcement resources.
  • Political dissidents and ordinary citizens bear the real risk, especially as politicians seek exemptions for their own communications.
  • Some express extreme fears of a slippery slope toward authoritarianism and even mass repression.

EU structure, transparency, and trust

• There is frustration at opaque EU processes: the Commission initiating laws, unclear individual responsibility, and back‑room negotiation of positions.
• Several call for more transparency about which national representatives and governments are pushing Chat Control so voters can hold them accountable.

Normalization of surveillance

• One thread notes that growing camera surveillance in schools may accustom younger generations to constant monitoring, making future measures like Chat Control easier to accept.