Bank of Thailand freezes 3M accounts, sets daily transfer limits to curb fraud

Scale and nature of fraud (Thailand & region)

• Thread context: Thailand faces large-scale online scams, with organized crime (including foreign syndicates) using “mule accounts,” weak KYC, and vulnerable populations.
• Common pattern: low-income people are paid to “rent out” their bank accounts; some older accounts had very lax or no modern KYC but still had online access.
• Regional dimension: scam compounds in Myanmar/Cambodia/Laos allegedly run industrial-scale fraud using trafficked workers; Thailand is both a victim market and a conduit for laundering.

Thailand’s measures and how they work in practice

• Bank of Thailand froze ~3 million accounts and imposed daily transfer limits (e.g., 50k baht for “new/high‑risk” customers, higher for others). Larger transfers can be specially approved within hours.
• Official framing: anti-scam crackdown targeting mule accounts and phone/account name mismatches, plus tighter rules on foreigners and certain visa classes.
• Later reporting (linked in thread) acknowledges many wrongful freezes: small retailers and individuals abruptly cut off from funds due to automated heuristics like transfers from “unknown sources.”

Impact on foreigners and domestic users

• Several commenters in Thailand report expat accounts being closed or frozen, especially those opened on tourist/digital‑nomad visas or with shared family phone numbers.
• Described as a “huge overreaction” that disrupts bill payment, commerce, and long‑stay foreigners’ daily life; others say lax enforcement had been abused and stricter rules are “long overdue.”
• Concern that Thailand effectively doesn’t want foreigners holding local accounts, or is using fraud as a pretext for tighter capital/foreigner controls; others push back, seeing it as genuine scam response.

Tradeoffs: fraud prevention vs civil liberties and usability

• Many approve of transfer limits and scrutiny for large/atypical payments (medical, housing, etc.) as analogous to limits in South Korea, Denmark, New Zealand, and US reporting thresholds.
• Strong disagreement on due process: some argue freezing suspected mule accounts first is necessary to prevent funds vanishing; others stress that due process should precede sanctions and that false positives are inevitable but harmful.

Broader context: scams, tech, and human factors

• Multiple anecdotes of sophisticated “pig-butchering,” e‑work scams, and social‑engineering of elderly and stressed individuals, including bank staff trying to stop determined victims.
• Consensus that technical measures (limits, KYC, 2FA) can’t fully prevent “wrench attacks” and social engineering; ultimately law enforcement and structural risk‑sharing by banks are needed.