U.S. already has the critical minerals it needs, according to new analysis

Environmental and technical realities of “thrown‑away” minerals

  • Much of the “waste” is in tailings from existing mines; commenters note this is standard in mining and sometimes re‑mined decades later as processes improve.
  • Refining critical minerals is described as “industrial chemistry” with unavoidable toxic byproducts (heavy metals, radioactivity). You can change their chemical form but not make them disappear.
  • Rare‑earth tailings ponds and slag are often toxic and sometimes radioactive, leading to Superfund‑style liabilities in the US.
  • Some argue media portrayals of Chinese rare‑earth waste ponds are sensationalized relative to, e.g., oil sands, but others say that’s “whataboutism”: the core problem is that the effluent has no use and is hard to dispose of.

China’s dominance, export controls, and geopolitical risk

  • Consensus that China controls most mining and especially refining, largely by accepting severe environmental externalities and using state‑directed industrial policy.
  • History cited: China has weaponized rare‑earth exports against Japan and South Korea, and now bans or restricts exports of gallium, germanium, antimony, samarium, and magnets to the US and allies.
  • Comments describe a broader “ex‑China” push: Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and others are trying to build non‑Chinese supply chains and motor technologies that use fewer rare earths.
  • Several note that even third‑country “sources” often just transship Chinese material, and that large‑scale laundering under export controls is hard.

Domestic mining economics, regulation, and industrial policy

  • The US has major deposits (e.g., Mountain Pass mine) and has historically led production, but price crashes and cheap Chinese competition repeatedly shut projects down.
  • Stringent US environmental rules, permitting delays, litigation risk, and NIMBY opposition make new mines and refineries slow and expensive; many existing mines would never be approved today.
  • Some argue for US sovereign or quasi‑sovereign investment funds (Temasek/Mubadala style) to coordinate long‑term mining and refining capacity, versus purely private, price‑driven firms.
  • DoD is already guaranteeing prices and taking stakes in rare‑earth firms to keep them running despite global price swings.

Stockpiling and diversification strategies

  • One camp suggests outsourcing dirty processing (often to China) while holding strategic stockpiles of processed materials and maintaining minimal domestic capacity.
  • Others argue 6 months of stockpile is far too little given China’s multi‑year planning horizon and potential wartime disruptions; “several years” of supply or substantial domestic capacity is seen as safer.
  • Balanced interdependence is floated: security improves if both sides rely on each other for different critical goods, but commenters note current US–China politics are drifting the opposite way.

Moral and political debates about offshoring pollution

  • Some openly say they’d rather “let China destroy their land and buy what we need,” then mine domestically only when foreign supplies are exhausted.
  • Others call this hypocritical: Western consumers enjoy clean air and cheap electronics while exporting health and environmental damage to countries with weaker protections and lower wages.
  • A minority insists the US should mine and refine at home under strict regulations, accepting higher prices and environmental costs as the ethical price of its standard of living. Skeptics respond there is no truly “clean” mining; there will always be serious externalities.

Clarifications about rarity and US resource base

  • Multiple commenters stress that rare earths are not geologically rare: they are widespread but very dilute, so economically viable extraction requires processing huge volumes of rock.
  • The US and allies (Canada, Australia) have “basically every material resource” needed; the binding constraints are cost, permitting, environmental tolerance, and loss of processing know‑how after decades of outsourcing.