Tell the EU: Don't Break Encryption with "Chat Control"

Mozilla’s Campaign and Credibility

• Some see Mozilla’s anti–Chat Control stance as off-brand given its past blog post arguing for stronger moderation of “harmful” speech; this is viewed as tacit support for censorship.
• Others distinguish clearly between limiting reach of propaganda on platforms and breaking confidentiality of private messaging, calling attempts to equate them bad-faith.
• There’s disagreement whether Mozilla has shifted principles, quietly buried old positions, or is simply a useful ally regardless of past stances.

EU Legislative Landscape

• Commenters note the proposal has been repeatedly pushed since ~2021 and is not “already blocked.”
• EU process is clarified: no unanimity is required; a qualified majority suffices, and only a blocking minority of countries is needed to stop it.
• Germany’s stance is reported as currently “undecided,” not firmly opposed, making passage plausible.

Ignorance vs Malice in Lawmaking

• One camp thinks politicians treat cryptography as “magic” and sincerely believe safe targeted backdoors might be possible, similar to naïve climate-tech expectations.
• Another argues politicians have ample expert access and know the risks; persistent pursuit is thus seen as power-consolidating malice, not incompetence.
• There’s broader cynicism about model legislation, lobbying, and EU roles used as “retirement homes” for failed national politicians.

Client-Side Scanning, Encryption, and Device Control

• Several emphasize Chat Control does not literally “break” encryption but defeats its purpose via client-side scanning and upload of plaintext to authorities.
• Some argue the opposition slogan should focus on “freedom to control our own devices” rather than on cryptography per se.
• Concerns extend to app-store notarization, OS-level controls, and even hardware backdoors, shrinking the space for unmonitored software.

Exemptions and Double Standards

• Reports that police, military, intelligence staff, and ministers may be exempt are seen as proof lawmakers themselves consider the system dangerous and unreliable.
• Commenters point out the security nightmare of creating two classes of communication (watched vs exempt), which also aids foreign intelligence and industrial espionage.

Privacy, Safety, and Political Control

• Many argue mass scanning will not stop serious criminals, who can switch to “illegal” tools, but will normalize surveillance for ordinary users and chill speech.
• A recurring view is that the real target is not child abuse or general public safety but preempting organized opposition and protecting politicians from threats.
• Comparisons are made to ubiquitous home surveillance or historic programs like ECHELON; some see Chat Control as the next iteration of mass monitoring.

Global and Practical Implications

• Non-EU users are reminded they’re affected when communicating with EU residents and when other governments copy the EU model.
• One perspective stresses that the law primarily applies to large platforms (e.g., social media / messaging at scale); direct encrypted communication outside such platforms would remain feasible.
• Others counter that most people will be pushed back into surveilled defaults while a minority continues using niche, possibly “illegal,” tools, offline key exchange, or alternative hardware/OSes.