Cache of devices capable of crashing cell network is found in NYC

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

U.S. Secret Service agents have seized a large network of SIM-box “device farms” around New York City, comprising hundreds of servers and over 100,000 SIM cards that officials say could be used to disrupt cellular service, enable anonymous calls and texts, and support swatting and other threats against government officials. Commenters question whether the setup was truly a terror-style attempt to crash the network or more likely a commercial-scale gray-market operation for spam, VoIP termination, bot accounts, and criminal communications, noting that mobile networks in dense cities are built to withstand heavy loads. The thread explores how such SIM farms work, how hard they are to detect and locate, the tenuous link to the nearby U.N. General Assembly, and broader concerns about sensationalized government framing versus the more mundane reality of telecom fraud infrastructure.

Likely Purpose of the SIM Farm

  • Many commenters see this as a large, but technically ordinary, SIM farm: commercial SIM-box/SMS-gateway hardware (64‑port units, hundreds of them) wired to mass SIM banks.
  • Primary suspected uses:
    • Grey‑route VoIP termination (turning cheap/unlimited mobile minutes into international calling).
    • Bulk SMS spam, phishing, and robocalls using “real” mobile numbers rather than VoIP, which get blocked less.
    • Receiving OTPs at scale for mass account creation (social media, messaging apps, fintech/crypto).
    • Providing “mobile numbers as a service” to other criminals and possibly propaganda / bot operations.
  • Swatting and telephonic threats to officials are seen as one use-case that drew attention, not the core business model.

DDoS / “Crashing NYC’s Network” Claims

  • Many are skeptical that 100k SIMs, spread across multiple sites in the NYC metro, could “topple” the city’s cell network.
  • In a very dense network (Manhattan), that’s more akin to a big event load; real denial-of-service would be easier with RF jammers.
  • Some note specific subsystems (e.g., 911 call/text handling, or poorly scaling legacy components) might be stressed, but broad citywide outage is considered unlikely.

UN and Nation‑State Angle

  • The “within 35 miles of the UN” framing is widely mocked: that radius covers essentially all of NYC and a large surrounding population.
  • Several see this as PR spin in the Secret Service release, echoed too uncritically by media.
  • The statement about “nation‑state threat actors” using the network is acknowledged, but many think that most usage was routine criminal traffic, with state actors (if present) as just another class of customer.

Detection, Tracing, and Legality

  • Discussion of why such farms are hard to immediately find:
    • Urban RF multipath, limited location precision, and the ability to lock devices to a single tower.
    • Carriers and MVNOs may not prioritize detection if impact is modest; fraud systems look more for obvious abuse.
  • Proposed detection methods: traffic pattern analysis, triangulation/multilateration, drive‑by spectrum analysis, and correlating abnormal power usage.
  • Legal status is murky: owning many SIMs isn’t inherently illegal in many jurisdictions; laws in some countries now target SIM farms specifically, but penalties may be low.

Broader Implications

  • Reinforces that phone-number verification and STIR/SHAKEN “verified” caller ID are weak defenses when attackers can cheaply farm tens of thousands of mobile numbers.
  • Several commenters express deep distrust of US government messaging and see this as a routine spam/VoIP/bot infrastructure bust rhetorically upgraded into a near‑terror plot.