Denmark wants to push through Chat Control

Perceived Inevitability vs Legal/Technical Pushback

• Many expect Chat Control (incl. client-side scanning) to pass “in one form or another,” driven by “think of the children” framing and incremental boiling-frog tactics.
• Others argue courts and separation of powers in the EU may still block or weaken it, but note each iteration returns stronger, wearing down resistance.
• Some see Denmark’s role as part of a wider EU pattern, not just US influence, and criticize elites on both sides of the Atlantic for converging on mass surveillance.

Effectiveness Against Crime vs Political Control

• Frequent skepticism that real criminals and organized crime will be stopped; they can switch to secure, custom, or offline-key systems.
• Many believe the main payoff is political control, blackmail potential, and chilling dissent, not child protection.
• A minority argument: even catching only “stupid criminals” still has value, but most replies emphasize mass surveillance is highly effective at eroding liberty, not safety.

Technical Models, Circumvention, and Escalation

• “Internet routes around” view: people will shift to Tor, Signal, custom ROMs, air‑gapped encryption, Linux phones, etc.
• Counterpoint: client-side scanning on mainstream OSes plus network blocks on “uncertified” devices could make evasion harder for non‑experts, turning this into a long cat‑and‑mouse game.
• Concern that scanning before encryption makes traditional end‑to‑end protections moot.

Democracy, EU Legitimacy, and Exemptions

• Strong distrust of the EU’s democratic legitimacy and of national leaders claiming to speak “for France/Denmark/the EU” while excluding public debate and ignoring protests.
• Reports that politicians, security services, and “national security” actors would be exempt from scanning infuriate commenters; the people most affected are ordinary users.
• Some argue this is “EU-style democracy” in action; others say voters never directly chose mass surveillance and can’t easily correct it.

Corporate, Geopolitical, and Economic Interests

• Several see this as driven less by “Stasi logic” and more by vendors like Palantir and Thorn lobbying for lucrative surveillance contracts, with opaque EU–industry relations flagged by the Ombudsman.
• A geopolitical realism thread argues that in a world of China/Russia information control and rising conflict, not monitoring is a strategic disadvantage; most replies reject copying authoritarian models as self-defeating.

Security, Backdoors, and Systemic Risk

• Widespread worry that mandated backdoors and client-side access create single points of failure for banking, identity, and communications—inevitably exploitable by hostile states, criminals, and insiders.
• Historical attempts at lawful-access systems are cited as evidence such schemes are inherently dangerous.
• Many expect surveillance powers to be hard to repeal, with long-term societal chilling effects and potential for eventual unrest.