How did sports betting become legal in the US?

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Scale and growth of sports betting

  • Commenters dispute headline claims that legal handle rose from $5B to $150B; several note pre‑legalization illegal markets were already tens or hundreds of billions.
  • Interest shifts from volume to prevalence: how many unique people now bet, and how much more frequently, is seen as the key unanswered question.
  • Some argue legalization plus app friction‑removal has clearly expanded participation; others suspect the 30x figure mostly reflects migration from illegal to legal channels and aggressive promotion.

Social harm vs personal freedom

  • Strong camp: sports betting is socially destructive — draining household savings, fueling addiction, harming spouses and children, and incentivizing game‑fixing and corruption.
  • Opposing camp: adults should be free to waste their money; government shouldn’t police “being an idiot,” and overregulation risks paternalism or authoritarianism.
  • Many accept some regulation is warranted where costs spill into public safety nets, families, or crime, but disagree sharply on how far to go.

Advertising, smartphones, and dark patterns

  • Broad anger at the ubiquity of betting ads in broadcasts, public spaces, podcasts, and youth‑oriented content; comparisons to tobacco marketing.
  • Phones and 24/7 apps are seen as a qualitative shift: no travel, no social friction, plus personalized push notifications, A/B‑tested promos, and behavioral targeting.
  • Some frame online betting and social media as using the same intermittent‑reward “slot‑machine” mechanics.

House edge, banning winners, and “skill”

  • Many highlight that platforms can and do limit or ban consistently winning or “sharp” bettors, effectively selecting only losing customers.
  • Exchanges that match users rather than take the opposite side are discussed as less conflicted but still fee‑driven.
  • There is debate over whether daily fantasy and some betting are “games of skill,” and whether that makes them better, worse, or just differently addictive.

Lotteries, other vices, and culture

  • Comparisons to state lotteries: seen by some as an even bigger regressive “tax,” with the only distinction that proceeds are earmarked for public goods.
  • Others equate or contrast sports betting with alcohol, tobacco, loot boxes, gacha, credit cards, porn, and social media, arguing either for consistent regulation of all or for a narrow focus on exploitative mechanics.
  • UK and Australian commenters note gambling is deeply normalized there; some in the US say it has quickly reached similar saturation.

Politics, law, and drivers of legalization

  • Several emphasize the core driver as money: tax revenue for states, profits for operators, and lobbying by DraftKings/FanDuel and casinos.
  • One thread stresses PASPA’s constitutional problems (federal overreach telling states what laws they may pass) and notes the Supreme Court signaled Congress could regulate or ban sports betting directly under the Commerce Clause.
  • Others argue “morals” were never the real brake; earlier bans reflected protectionism by incumbents and tribes more than concern for citizens.

Proposed reforms

  • Ideas range from outright bans to:
    • Tobacco‑style ad bans or anti‑ads.
    • Hard per‑person or income‑linked betting caps.
    • Shifting liability to operators once a user exceeds some share of income.
    • Treating betting more like credit (risk‑assessed limits) or like private placements (only “accredited” bettors).
  • Skeptics doubt partial fixes can work given industry incentives; others see them as a way to cut harm while preserving some adult choice.