Britain to introduce compulsory digital ID for workers

Existing systems and what’s actually new

• UK already has multiple identifiers: National Insurance numbers, NHS numbers, passports, driving licences, “share codes” for right-to-work, and GOV.UK One Login; many argue a new ID layer adds little.
• Some note NI is not proof of right-to-work and can be “rented” or misused, but others reply that current digital right‑to‑work checks already address this in law.
• Supporters see this as standardising and digitising a messy patchwork into one state-backed identity wallet; critics see it as yet another database linking everything together.

Migration and illegal work claims

• Government frames the scheme as a tool to “tackle illegal immigration” and prevent illegal employment.
• Many commenters say this is largely cosmetic: employers already must verify right‑to‑work and serious abusers simply ignore the rules or pay cash.
• Several argue illegal working in gig platforms (Deliveroo/Uber account rentals) is an enforcement problem, not an ID problem.
• Some suggest the real political driver is to be seen to “do something” about small boats and outflank Reform, not to materially change migration flows.

Surveillance, privacy, and online identity

• Strong fear that a universal digital ID will be tied next to:
  • age verification for porn and online retail,
  • under‑16 social media bans,
  • Online Safety Act enforcement,
  • and eventually de‑facto real‑name use for most of the internet.
• Slippery-slope scenario: ID first for work, then renting, benefits, voting, then access to websites; anonymity steadily eroded.
• This is seen in the context of existing UK powers: mass data retention, encryption backdoor provisions, CCTV saturation, Palantir contracts, and arrests for “online posts”.

Smartphones, platforms, and inclusion

• Serious concern that ID “on people’s phones” means:
  • de‑facto compulsory smartphone ownership for working-age adults,
  • lock‑in to Apple/Google app stores and ToS,
  • problems for those unwilling (not just unable) to use smartphones.
• Some reports mention a physical chip card option, but details are vague; people worry non‑phone paths will be second‑class or disappear over time.

Civil liberties, policing, and Northern Ireland

• UK has a strong tradition of not requiring citizens to carry ID or present it on demand; many see any move toward “papers please” as a constitutional shift.
• Fears that digital ID will enable roadside checks, immigration raids, and profiling (“suspected illegal” until you prove otherwise).
• In Northern Ireland, branding it a “BritCard” is flagged as politically toxic given the Good Friday Agreement and dual-identity rights.

Comparisons and technical design

• Some from ID-card countries (Nordics, Netherlands, Estonia) report benefits: easier e‑government, banking, signatures; this softens a few UK skeptics.
• Others stress the UK is different: long record of IT failures (Post Office scandal, data breaches), low trust in government, and weak privacy safeguards.
• Cryptographic approaches (chips, signatures, zero‑knowledge proofs) are discussed as ways to limit central tracking, but many doubt they’ll be correctly or exclusively implemented.

Public and political reaction

• A fast-growing official petition against digital ID has passed a million signatures; yet polling cited in-thread suggests ID cards in principle are not hugely unpopular.
• Some see this as a recycled Blair‑era project with new “immigration” branding; others think it’s a disposable conference gimmick unlikely to pass Parliament.
• Overall tone is highly skeptical: even those open to digital identity in abstract often say they trust the UK state and its contractors least to run it.