High-power microwave defeats drone swarm

Technical capabilities & basic physics

  • Thread notes the article is light on specs; commenters cite ~70 kW power use, millisecond pulses, ~2 km effective range, truck‑trailer sized generator.
  • System is described as a high‑power microwave (HPM) phased array, not a nuclear‑style EMP. GaN transistors at microwave frequencies allow tight beams and electronic steering.
  • Some argue aircraft are largely safe due to shielding (metal fuselage, lightning tolerance); small consumer drones with exposed wiring and sensitive electronics are prime targets.

Power, logistics, and deployment

  • 70 kW generators are tractable for a single unit but become logistically heavy when scaled to hundreds of emitters for base defense (fuel trucks, continuous operation).
  • This is seen as a “rear area / high‑value site” system, not something that would survive long on a hot front line.

Collateral effects and safety

  • Concern about hitting unintended targets: nearby small planes, other drones, birds, and civilian electronics.
  • Others counter that beam directionality and rapid falloff with distance should limit incidental damage, though exact risk is unclear.

Shielding and countermeasures

  • Multiple comments say simple Faraday shielding, conductive paints/foils, shielded cabling, and fiber‑optic control could rapidly blunt effectiveness.
  • Counter‑argument: truly robust EM hardening adds cost, weight, and new design complexity, undermining the cheap‑drone advantage.
  • Debate over whether motor coils and PCBs are easily upset antennas; consensus is that strong fields can still induce damaging currents or logic upsets, but power required scales with shielding quality.

Effectiveness vs real‑world drone warfare

  • Several tie this to Ukraine: current battles involve thousands of drones; front‑line units need cheap, ubiquitous defenses, not exquisite few‑of‑a‑kind systems.
  • HPM is seen as last‑ditch protection for rear assets; it doesn’t solve low‑altitude FPV or fiber‑tethered drones near trenches.

Alternative defenses

  • Suggested alternatives: shotgun‑style anti‑drone guns, SPAAG/CIWS‑type systems (Gepard, C‑RAM, Skyshield), cheap guided rockets (APKWS), jamming, and kinetic interception.
  • Electrolasers and lightning‑like plasma weapons are discussed but viewed as likely impractical beyond small, fixed targets.

Skepticism and PR

  • Some see the demo and cinematic promo as classic defense‑industry marketing: impressive against unshielded show drones, unproven against hardened or evolving threats.
  • Others argue outright fraud is unlikely at this level, but note historical examples of overhyped or ineffective military tech.