Aphantasia and Psychedelics

Psychedelics and aphantasia: what people report

• Several self-identified aphantasics say psychedelics do produce visuals, but often as overlays on real perception: textures “breathing,” colors shifting, fractal patterns, faces emerging from bark or clouds.
• Others report that only very strong doses or specific substances (notably DMT, sometimes LSD+DXM) give them vivid open-eye visuals; 2C‑B, psilocybin, and mescaline are described as weaker or mainly pattern‑based.
• A few say most drugs (mushrooms, THC, opiates, even morphine) barely affect perception or headspace, often noting neurodivergence or unusually high required doses.
• Multiple commenters stress that psychedelic visuals feel different from imagination: they alter the actual visual field, rather than appearing in a separate “inner screen.”

Dreams, hypnagogia, meditation

• Many aphantasics report vivid visual dreams despite no waking imagery, suggesting different neural circuits for dreaming vs. voluntary imagery.
• Some only experience clear imagery while falling asleep (hypnagogia) or occasionally during deep meditation; these moments are described as astonishingly vivid and qualitatively unlike normal “thinking.”
• One person links meditation aimed at improving imagery with triggering ocular migraines, reducing their motivation to push further.

What counts as imagery? Conceptual vs. visual

• A recurring theme: people who “see nothing” can still describe scenes, rotate 3D objects, design, draw, or solve spatial problems using non‑visual, conceptual representations.
• Several note they “know” the house, bike, or apple without any picture—like wireframe or abstract layout—raising doubts about simple “can you see an apple?” tests.
• Others describe very faint, short‑lived flashes or outlines, or imagery that only fills in details “on demand.”

Testing and defining aphantasia

• Proposed tests include the “apple scale” and an imagined room/ball/table scenario, with follow‑up questions about details.
• Critics argue these are vulnerable to post‑hoc confabulation, overclaiming, and language differences; meta‑ignorance and witness‑testimony analogies are raised.
• There is mention of brain‑imaging work and twin case studies, but interpretation remains contested.

Ethics and desirability of “fixing” it

• Some see aphantasia as a “superpower” for conceptual focus and minimal distraction, and dislike framing it as a deficit.
• Ethical concerns: pathologizing diversity; unknown emotional impact of suddenly gaining imagery; possible links between extreme imagery and psychiatric risk; and cognitive “enhancement” implications.
• Training methods like “image streaming” are mentioned, alongside cautions (e.g., eye‑rubbing risks).

Skepticism and meta‑debate

• A significant minority suspects aphantasia is overdiagnosed, fad‑driven, or largely linguistic confusion about what “see” means.
• Others, including people who lost imagery after surgery or have experienced both states, insist the difference is stark and not just semantics.
• Both sides agree that introspective reports are the only current window into these experiences, making the topic inherently hard to settle.