Europe Can No Longer Ignore That It's Under Russian Attack

Longstanding Warnings and Russian Strategy

• Several comments argue Europe “had plenty of warning”: Putin’s 2007 Munich speech, the war in Georgia, MH17, and ongoing cyber/sabotage activity.
• The book Foundations of Geopolitics is cited as an ideological blueprint whose prescriptions (esp. in the Americas/Europe) many see reflected in current events like Brexit and disinformation.
• Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and Nordics are portrayed as having few illusions and long seeing themselves in a de facto asymmetric conflict with Russia.

Energy Dependence and Sanctions

• Strong debate over how much Europe still finances Russia via fossil-fuel imports.
• Some say Germany was once the main culprit but has now largely stopped, leaving Hungary/Slovakia and rerouted flows (e.g., via Turkstream). Others say new data show China/India as main buyers and highlight “laundered” oil.
• There’s disagreement on feasibility of fully “turning off the tap”: one side stresses structural dependence, high LNG prices, and slow replacement via nuclear/renewables; others blame decades of bad policy and argue the only solution is to start serious transition now.
• US LNG exports to Europe are noted as high but expensive; some see this as benevolent help, others as opportunistic.

Hybrid War, Drones, and Airspace Incidents

• Many interpret drone incursions and airspace violations as hybrid warfare: cheap psychological pressure, economic disruption, and attempts to raise European threat perceptions.
• Alternative readings: efforts to keep European air-defense systems at home rather than in Ukraine; or “horizontal escalation” to widen the conflict and justify mobilization.
• Skeptics question the evidence, stressing the drones are “unidentified” and incidents conveniently support EU militarization and asset seizures.

NATO, Escalation, and Support for Ukraine

• One camp: Europe is effectively at war via arms supplies; NATO/US should prioritize de-escalation, acknowledge NATO expansion fears, and consider negotiated settlements. They point to Western inconsistency (e.g., Iraq, Gaza) and worry about military–industrial incentives.
• Opposing camp: Russia is the clear aggressor; NATO is a voluntary defensive club; appeasement since 2014 encouraged the invasion. Cutting military aid is seen as forcing Ukrainian surrender and inviting future Russian aggression against EU states.
• There is sharp disagreement over whether criticizing aid equals “supporting Russia” and whether decisions have been democratically legitimate.

Russian Strength, Nuclear Risk, and Europe’s Response

• Some portray Russia as overextended, corrupt, demographically broken, running a war economy that is unsustainable; others note visible infrastructure investment and warn collapse is not imminent.
• Controversial debate on the reliability of Russia’s nuclear arsenal: from “likely decayed” to “even a fraction is enough, so don’t test it.”
• Many commenters argue Europe is not “ignoring” the threat: they point to increased defense spending, fortification in the Baltics and Poland, German rearmament, “drone wall” proposals, and moves to use frozen Russian assets for Ukraine—though some see this as necessary defense, others as fear-driven escalation and a boon to arms manufacturers.