The UK is still trying to backdoor encryption for Apple users
UK plans to compel Apple to provide access to encrypted iCloud backups and Advanced Data Protection for users in Britain are raising fresh alarms over government backdoors into consumer devices. Commenters debate whether Apple should withdraw from markets that demand weakened encryption, stressing that any capitulation in the UK could trigger similar demands worldwide. Others argue that relying on closed, OTA‑updatable platforms and cloud storage controlled by large vendors is inherently unsafe, calling instead for open, verifiable systems and greater public resistance to expanding surveillance powers.
Device Control, OTA Updates, and Ownership
- Several argue that as long as OEMs can silently push OTA updates to locked-down devices, any “backdoor” is effectively a front door.
- Root problem is seen as users not truly owning their hardware: trusted computing, locked bootloaders, and proprietary OSes prevent independent verification.
- Proposed remedies: fully FOSS OS outside app sandboxes, open hardware specs, reproducible builds, and user-controlled build/deploy chains; others note even that is hard in practice.
Apple, Governments, and Market Incentives
- Some hope Apple will refuse UK demands or withdraw from the market; others doubt this given Apple’s past concessions in China and general corporate profit motives.
- One view: capitulating to China is “unique” and strategically unavoidable, but giving in to the UK would create a global precedent and flood of similar demands.
- Consensus that relying on big companies to protect rights is misguided; this is fundamentally a political struggle between citizens and states.
Advanced Data Protection (ADP) and Encrypted Backups
- Confusion and debate over what the UK is targeting: encrypted iCloud backups versus ADP itself.
- Clarified by several: ADP was blocked for new UK users; the current demand focuses on iPhone iCloud backups where Apple still holds decryption capability.
- Disagreement about how many users actually enable ADP; some claim it’s a rounding error, others push back and demand evidence.
- Discussion on whether encryption where the provider holds keys is “really” encryption; many say it’s effectively not, at least against state actors.
- Concern about how Apple could forcibly disable ADP for existing UK users without data loss, and what defines a “UK user” (region, residency, App Store account, etc.).
Cloud, Threat Models, and Alternatives
- Some say the real step toward “1984” was centralizing personal data in large cloud silos; compelled access via warrants is then inevitable.
- Safety-deposit-box analogy: provider-held keys trade privacy for recoverability; ADP is framed as the “only you have the key” option.
- Suggestions include self-hosting and standardized sync protocols so devices can point to user-owned servers.
Legal Compulsion and Civil Liberties
- UK and France cited as examples where refusing to reveal passwords/keys can itself be a crime, with substantial prison terms.
- Many express alarm that anti-encryption measures are sold as anti-crime/child-abuse tools while steadily normalizing surveillance, with little public pushback.
- Some blame poor civic education and public apathy about privacy and freedom.
Who Wants This and Why?
- Multiple comments argue there is no real democratic constituency for backdoors; demand is driven by security services and intelligence agencies.
- Others broaden this to entrenched power centers (civil services, media, billionaires), but there’s disagreement over who actually drives policy.
- Strong fear that once such backdoors exist and are normalized, rollback will be politically and technically impossible.