German government comes out against Chat Control

Scope of Chat Control vs. Lawful Interception

• Many distinguish between traditional, targeted “lawful interception” (judge-approved wiretaps on identified suspects for limited time) and ChatControl’s blanket, proactive scanning of everyone’s private communications.
• Some argue that chat services should be treated like telecoms and obliged to support targeted interception, as with phones and mail.
• Others counter that this is a category error: E2E chat is more akin to mandating microphones in every room than to tapping a phone line.

Technical Feasibility and Security Risks

• Multiple comments stress that “lawful intercept for E2E” is technically impossible without weakening encryption for everyone or backdooring endpoints.
• Proposed alternatives (key escrow, client backdoors, forced client updates) are described as either malware in disguise or infrastructure that will inevitably be abused or hacked (with examples of lawful-intercept systems being compromised).
• Some note that targeted device hacking already exists under warrant, but this is criticized for feeding a state-sponsored malware ecosystem.

Civil Liberties, History, and Slippery Slopes

• Strong concern that any “exceptional access” becomes a general panopticon as norms drift and new governments reinterpret powers.
• Historical references: postal interception, wiretapping, Stasi, Gestapo, East Germany; many argue mass scanning of private communication goes beyond anything seen before.
• Several reject the idea that fraud prevention or “online safety” justify eroding private spaces, seeing this as an attack on trust and free association.

Political Dynamics in Germany and the EU

• German conservative opposition to “cause-less” ChatControl is welcomed but widely treated as tactical and reversible; warnings that the proposal or a rebranded variant will return.
• Debate over whether the driving force is “the EU” as a whole, specific member-state governments, or the Commission and Council interacting.
• Far-right parties formally oppose ChatControl now, but many predict they would embrace such tools once in power.

Motives, Lobbying, and Industry

• Several point to “online safety” NGOs and their commercial partners as key promoters, seeking monopolistic CSAM-scanning deployments in all devices.
• Examples are given of firms pivoting from moral rhetoric to overpriced parental-surveillance products, reinforcing suspicion of profit-driven motives.

Resistance, Activism, and Pessimism

• Calls for continuous civic resistance: petitions, legal challenges, building and using privacy-preserving tech, and accepting civil disobedience if necessary.
• Recurrent theme: privacy advocates must “win every time,” while surveillance advocates only need one legislative success.
• Some express deep pessimism about long-term trends (surveillance creep, erosion of rights, “dying internet”), others argue that eternal vigilance and technical friction can still meaningfully delay or block such regimes.