Suspicionless ChatControl must be taboo in a state governed by the rule of law

Constitution, Rule of Law, and EU Context

• Some argue Germany’s “Basic Law” functions as a constitution and already bans mass surveillance without cause, so ChatControl conflicts with existing protections.
• Others claim those protections are weak in practice: courts allow intrusive measures for trivial reasons, and laws frequently conflict with the Basic Law.
• Finland is cited as having formally rejected the latest ChatControl compromise on constitutional grounds.
• Several comments stress that Germany’s current opposition is due largely to public pressure, not deep constitutional principle, and could flip again.

“Suspicionless” vs Targeted Surveillance

• Many see “suspicionless” (better translated as “without cause” or “unfounded”) as weasel wording that implicitly legitimizes “with suspicion” ChatControl.
• A strong faction insists any client-side scanning or default backdoor must be categorically banned, regardless of suspicion or warrants.
• Others draw a distinction between mass backdoors and traditional targeted wiretaps or device trojans under court order, which they see as debatably acceptable.

Encryption, Backdoors, and Device Security

• Broad agreement that a generalized backdoor breaks end‑to‑end encryption for everyone and inevitably gets abused or leaked.
• Debate over how to protect against government-mandated malware or modified app updates: suggestions include banning remote installs, binary transparency, multiple app stores, and open-source/reproducible builds.
• Some argue that if the device itself is compromised (e.g., CPU or OS backdoored), no software solution like GPG can truly help, only offline or physically separate devices.

Trust, Warrants, and Abuse Risks

• One side argues we must accept some crime to preserve privacy for hundreds of millions; any mass surveillance “cure” is worse than the disease.
• Another insists society must still handle serious criminals, via warrants and targeted operations, not blanket monitoring.
• Skeptics note warrants are often rubber‑stamped and existing oversight is too weak to justify new powers.
• Multiple comments stress that any surveillance infrastructure, once built, will eventually be used by less benevolent regimes or during crises.

Comparisons to China and Authoritarian States

• Some question linking encrypted chat to “rule of law” by pointing out that stable societies existed without widespread encryption.
• Others respond that digital life and cheap data storage enable unprecedented pervasive monitoring, so encryption is now the only way to restore the privacy we once had with letters and phone calls.
• China’s Great Firewall is debated: described by some as outright oppression, by others as partly a cultural barrier with extensive real-world circumvention.
• Commenters warn Western democracies are edging toward capabilities that past totalitarian regimes could only dream of.

Radical Transparency vs Privacy

• One participant advocates “information totalism”: all information (including personal) should be public to eliminate manipulation.
• Most replies strongly reject this, emphasizing consent: you may expose your own data, not others’.
• Critics argue such a world would feel like a coercive hive mind, vulnerable to state discrimination and overwhelmed by propaganda and falsehoods.

Activism and Practical Steps

• Several comments emphasize that Germany’s stance shows activism works: writing representatives, public campaigns, and NGOs (EDRi, noyb, EFF) matter.
• Suggestions: keep political pressure high, oppose any form of client-side scanning, and vote for parties clearly rejecting ChatControl, not just “suspicionless” variants.