Google blocks Android hack that let Pixel users enable VoLTE anywhere

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Carrier control, certification, and interoperability

  • Many see the block as driven by carrier pressure: carriers typically only allow VoLTE/VoWiFi on devices they sell or have explicitly tested, often via whitelisted configuration files.
  • VoLTE/VoWiFi/VoNR are viewed as complex, SIP-based systems with many carrier-specific quirks; carriers claim untested implementations risk interoperability and emergency-call reliability.
  • Others argue carriers also use this control for commercial reasons (e.g., blocking roaming via WiFi calling, pushing users to buy carrier-branded devices).

User freedom, ownership, and legality

  • Strong disagreement over whether Google was “legally compelled” to patch this:
    • One side: radio devices and cellular networks are critical infrastructure; manufacturers must enforce carrier/network constraints to keep licenses and avoid liability.
    • Other side: no law against VoLTE itself was cited; if anyone violates local rules it’s the user, not Google. Blocking features globally is seen as carrier-corporate collusion and an attack on device ownership.
  • Broader resentment over the idea that purchased devices effectively remain under manufacturer/carrier control, compared to cars with remote shutoff.

“Vulnerability” framing

  • Many ridicule calling this a “high‑severity privilege escalation” since it required adb/Shizuku and user cooperation.
  • Others reply that letting users override carrier settings is, from the carrier/regulator point of view, a serious issue even if the radio layer isn’t directly modified.
  • Some worry Google’s targeted fix against Pixel IMS may lead to removing powerful shell permissions entirely, further locking down Android.

Real-world impacts and technical details

  • Users relied on the hack to:
    • Enable VoLTE/VoWiFi/VoNR on unsupported carriers or in unsupported countries.
    • Use “backup calling” (WiFi calling via secondary SIM data) to dodge roaming charges; this is said to be allowed on iOS but often blocked on Pixels.
  • Discussion highlights that VoLTE/VoWiFi are similar under the hood, VoNR is “VoLTE for 5G,” and some fallbacks (CSFB, emergency calls, alerts) are fragile.
  • Australian 3G shutdown is cited: many VoLTE-capable but non‑approved phones were effectively killed or even IMEI‑blocked, ostensibly over emergency-call compliance.

Ecosystem frustration and alternatives

  • Complaints about fragmented Android features: WiFi calling and voicemail often depend on carrier branding, region, or hidden toggles.
  • Some see this as another example of Google’s “open source until it matters” posture and compare Android’s ecosystem to Windows OEM bloat.
  • GrapheneOS is praised for adding official VoLTE/VoWiFi/VoNR overrides despite Google’s patch; others advocate moving to Linux phones or pure VoIP plus data-only SIMs, with caveats around 911/000 access.