Ofcom fines 4chan £20K and counting for violating UK's Online Safety Act

Enforceability and Symbolism of the Fine

• Many argue the fine is effectively unenforceable: 4chan is US‑based, apparently has no UK presence or assets, and is unlikely to pay or materially suffer.
• Others counter that it’s not “just symbolic” because non‑payment can, in principle, lead to arrest if responsible individuals travel to the UK (and potentially to countries that cooperate with UK enforcement).
• There’s disagreement over how serious a loss it is to be effectively barred from the UK; some see it as trivial, others as a meaningful restriction on freedom of movement.

Jurisdiction, Extradition, and “Police State” Claims

• Long subthreads debate extra‑territorial jurisdiction: whether a country can demand compliance from foreign sites merely because they’re accessible locally.
• Some draw parallels to Russian fines against Google and Belarus/Russia‑style tactics; others insist the UK remains a flawed democracy enforcing bad laws, not an outright authoritarian state.
• The risk of unexpected diversions (flights rerouted to the UK) is raised as a non‑obvious way people could be exposed to arrest.

Censorship, Blocking, and VPNs

• Many expect Ofcom’s real endgame is to order UK ISPs to block 4chan after demonstrating “non‑compliance” through steps like this fine.
• Commenters note the UK already blocks some sites (e.g. Pirate Bay) and see 4chan as a “think of the children” test case to justify stronger blocking powers.
• VPNs and Tor are discussed as workarounds; some mention recurring political interest in restricting VPNs or compelling key disclosure, and the massive infosec and corporate IT fallout such moves would create.

Online Safety Act Goals vs Overreach

• Supporters emphasize the Act’s stated aim: preventing children from accessing porn and harmful content (including suicide‑encouraging sites like “Sanctioned Suicide”).
• Others doubt technical feasibility or effectiveness, argue that parenting and existing laws should be primary controls, and worry that bans on suicide discussion could hinder harm‑reduction or research.
• There’s recognition that “child protection” rules can be used to push platforms out indirectly instead of overtly censoring them.

Platform Power, Precedent, and Internet Fragmentation

• Several note that large platforms can afford compliance, while smaller sites cannot, so laws like this entrench incumbents.
• Comparisons are drawn to GDPR and Russian data‑localization demands as precedents for extraterritorial regulation that can conflict across jurisdictions.
• Some advocate sites simply blocking the UK; others fear this leads toward a balkanized, nation‑firewalled internet where the most restrictive law effectively governs everyone.

Ofcom’s Strategy and Regulatory Politics

• One view: Ofcom is just mechanically enforcing a bad law, following a statutory escalation path (information requests → fines → potential blocking).
• Another view: targeting a notorious but relatively poor US site with legal support is tactically dumb and will show other US companies they can defy Ofcom.
• Skepticism extends to UK regulators generally (Ofcom, Ofwat, Ofgem), with accusations of incompetence, regulatory capture, and political pressure from moral‑panics and “think of the children” constituencies.