Roc Camera

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Purpose and Concept

  • Device is a Raspberry Pi–based camera that attaches a cryptographic proof (marketed as a ZK proof) to each image, claiming to attest that a given photo came from that camera and is unmodified.
  • Many commenters note it does not prove that the depicted scene is “real” or non‑AI, only that “this file was produced by this device with this firmware and metadata.”

Attacks and Limitations

  • “Analog hole” is repeatedly raised: you can photograph a screen, projection, or high‑quality print of an AI image and still get a valid proof.
  • Depth/LiDAR and extra sensors (IMU, GPS, ambient audio, etc.) are suggested to make such rebroadcasting harder, but others point out those signals can be spoofed (e.g., FPGA feeding CSI-2, HDMI‑to‑CSI adapters, fake sensor boards).
  • Even perfect attestation cannot address staging or selective framing; you can cryptographically prove a real photo of a misleading or manipulated scene.
  • Without a secure element on the sensor or SoC, several argue the current design cannot meaningfully prevent fully synthetic input.

Existing Standards and Alternatives

  • Multiple references to C2PA and camera-vendor schemes (Sony, Leica, Nikon, Canon). These sign images and/or edit histories; some earlier implementations were cracked.
  • Some say a simple per‑camera signing key is enough and ZK is just hype; others emphasize that richer, chained provenance (device + software edits) is the more mature direction.

Hardware and Product Design Reactions

  • Strong criticism of the $399 price for what appears to be a Pi 4, off‑the‑shelf IMX519 module, and visibly 3D‑printed case with cheap buttons.
  • Concerns about image quality (tiny sensor), Pi boot time and power draw, lack of current export function, and janky marketing site (scroll hijacking).
  • A minority defend it as a scrappy hardware experiment worth supporting even if rough; others call it a “toy” or “crypto gimmick.”

Open Source, Security Model, and ZK Debate

  • One side claims open-sourcing would break trust (users could sign AI images); others explain secure boot / HSM designs where user-modified firmware simply doesn’t get the vendor’s attestation key.
  • Several people ask what the ZK proof is actually proving beyond what a standard signature would, and note the site gives almost no technical detail.

Use Cases, Trust, and Social Implications

  • Suggested serious uses: journalism, courts, law enforcement, insurance, bodycams, real estate documentation.
  • Others argue that in practice authenticity will remain a matter of institutional and personal reputation, and that cryptographic “realness” may be overvalued, dystopian, or quickly undermined, much like DRM or NFTs.