The International Criminal Court wants to become independent of USA technology

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Motivation: Sanctions and Microsoft Account Shutdown

  • Central trigger: a prosecutor’s Microsoft email account at the ICC was blocked due to US sanctions, highlighting how a single US decision can partially paralyze a critical institution.
  • Some say Microsoft had “no choice” under US law; others emphasize that this demonstrates why it’s inherently risky for the ICC to depend on US providers subject to a volatile political environment.

Data Sovereignty and Dependency on Big Tech

  • Broad support for reducing reliance on “globomegacorps” whose size and political exposure create systemic risk.
  • Risk is framed as both technical (loss of access, lock-in) and political (sanctions, informal pressure, “phone call from the president”).
  • Several argue diversification across jurisdictions and vendors is more realistic than full independence from for‑profit firms.

Profit, Nonprofits, Capitalism, and Control

  • Debate whether the core problem is profit or control.
    • One side: for‑profit incentives (maximizing revenue, avoiding displeasing powerful states) inherently distort behavior.
    • Other side: nonprofits still depend on funding, follow local laws, and can be coerced; what matters is control over source code, deployment, and infrastructure.
  • Longer sub‑thread on capitalism as a decision/coordination mechanism vs. collective deliberation, and on how property rights and lack of “unclaimed resources” undermine idealized justifications.

Migration from Microsoft and Cloud Services

  • Some are pessimistic: public-sector dependence on Microsoft and legacy systems plus staff retraining makes exit “nigh impossible.”
  • Others counter with examples of gradual, successful migrations and argue this is a long “marathon” requiring commitment to higher values than the cheapest short‑term solution.
  • Many see the episode as a delayed realization that outsourcing critical IT (especially to US clouds claiming “data stays in the EU”) sacrifices real sovereignty.

Self‑Hosting, Email, and Practical Obstacles

  • Mixed experiences on self‑hosting email:
    • Some report chronic deliverability problems with big providers (especially in the 2000s–early 2010s).
    • Others say, with proper DNS and anti‑spam setup, self-hosted email works reliably even today.
  • General sense: big organizations like the ICC can self-host or use sovereign providers more easily than small “little guy” domains.

ICC, US Law, and International Justice

  • Several note the irony of relying on companies from a country that doesn’t recognize the ICC and has legislation hostile to it.
  • Extended debate on why any state would accept supra‑national law, the weakness of international enforcement, and whether joining the ICC would meaningfully constrain or protect powerful states like the US.

European Initiatives and Open Source

  • Article mentions EU‑linked efforts (e.g., OpenDesk, Zendis) to build sovereign infrastructure.
  • Skepticism from some that EU “digital sovereignty” projects become consultant-heavy, conference‑driven money sinks with little going to core open‑source developers.
  • Others argue governments should invest far more in local/EU tech, which has historically been neglected and underpaid compared to US tech sectors.