Uncle Sam wants to scan your iris and collect your DNA, citizen or not

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Continuity of Surveillance and Overreach

  • Many see this proposal as part of a 20+ year security-state drift since 9/11, not a sharp break.
  • Others argue the current push feels qualitatively different because it’s openly authoritarian in tone and scope.
  • Some stress that both major US parties have expanded executive power and surveillance; others worry “both-sides” framing obscures unique recent attempts to overturn elections.

Authoritarianism, Politics, and System Design

  • Debate over whether focus should be on “who is in the White House” or on building systems that assume an authoritarian will eventually get power.
  • Several argue US presidential systems make personality cults and power-grabs easier than parliamentary systems.
  • Others contend the real failure is voters and institutions allowing obvious authoritarians to keep power rather than prosecuting or disqualifying them.

Biometrics vs DNA: Different Levels of Harm

  • Broad agreement that DNA collection is a major escalation beyond fingerprints/iris scans.
  • DNA is seen as uniquely sensitive: reveals family relationships, health risks, and possible tailored attack vectors, not just identity.
  • Some note practical constraints (sample degradation, cost of large-scale sequencing), but others counter that technology is improving and databases, once built, will be abused or leaked.

Current Biometric Practices and “Already on File” Argument

  • Many commenters report having fingerprints, photos, or iris scans taken already: immigration processes, Global Entry/TSA, security clearances, passports, EU/other national ID schemes.
  • Counterpoint: targeted or conditional collection (e.g., for travel or specific jobs) is not equivalent to mandatory national DNA/iris databases for all citizens and associated persons.

California Newborn Blood Samples Debate

  • Strong subthread on California’s newborn heel-prick blood spots, stored since the 1980s.
  • One side frames this as a de facto lifelong DNA sample database; others push back that:
    • It’s dried blood for medical screening and quality control, not pre-sequenced genomes.
    • Law-enforcement access requires warrants, though policies and oversight are unclear.
  • Disagreement over whether calling this a “DNA database” is accurate vs. incendiary.

Resistance, Futility, and What To Do

  • Link shared to submit public comments; some dismiss the process as purely performative under the current administration.
  • Others argue fatalism is self-defeating: public comments, court challenges, protest, and voting are still the only available levers.
  • A few urge technologists to build privacy-preserving identity systems so governments can’t easily repurpose them for dragnet control.