IP blocking the UK is not enough to comply with the Online Safety Act

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Service economies and “exporting” law

  • Some see the UK (and wider Anglosphere) as having shifted from making things to “rent extraction” and services, then trying to export their legal regimes as a substitute for lost industrial power.
  • Others dispute this, noting the US and UK have long influenced global rules, and that legal activism often follows loss of market power (similar to “loser firms” turning to regulation).

Motivations behind the Online Safety Act and Ofcom

  • Many commenters view Ofcom’s actions less as “public safety” and more as:
    • Protecting domestic media/NGO interests and controlling discourse.
    • Creating a patronage system of approved censors.
  • Others argue the OSA came largely from academics/NGOs, is broadly popular in the UK, and not simply a Murdoch/tabloid project.
  • UK politics: the Act had strong cross‑party support; some feel there was no way to vote against it, though one smaller party now talks about repeal.

Jurisdiction and extraterritorial overreach

  • Core objection: UK is asserting effective global jurisdiction over US‑hosted, US‑legal content, even where operators have no UK presence and have geoblocked UK IPs.
  • People distinguish between:
    • UK’s right to block content domestically (firewall, ISP blocking).
    • UK threatening foreign operators with fines/arrest for speech lawful where it’s published.
  • Concerns about precedent: if 195 countries did this, running any user‑content site would be legally impossible.

Geoblocking and IP location

  • Several argue IP geolocation is good enough at the country level using RIR allocation data.
  • Others counter with concrete failures: leased/sold blocks, roaming, clouds, and RIPE’s own warning that “country” fields don’t reliably reflect physical use; perfection is impossible.
  • Dispute over Ofcom’s claim: Ofcom says a mirror domain remained reachable from the UK; the defense claims the mirror was also geoblocked and Ofcom is exploiting edge leaks to reopen action.

Suicide forums, harm, and paternalism

  • One camp: banning suicide forums denies bodily autonomy and can prolong severe suffering; such spaces may act as coping outlets, not just “funnels to death”.
  • Another camp: in practice vulnerable, depressed people are easily coerced or encouraged; unmoderated forums can amplify harm and “first, do no harm” implies heavy regulation and clinical oversight.
  • A middle view accepts Ofcom may genuinely care about coercion/abuse but insists jurisdiction must stop at the UK border; otherwise global communication collapses under conflicting laws.

US constitutional angles and responses

  • Debate over whether foreign enforcement can meaningfully “violate” the First Amendment when that binds only the US government, not the UK.
  • Many argue the real 1A issue would be if the US cooperated with UK judgments (extradition, asset seizure, payment‑processor pressure); some call for a US “shield law” to forbid this.
  • Others note US hypocrisy: it already uses extraterritorial tools (FATCA, anti‑piracy, sanctions, payment‑network pressure) and has targeted foreign sites and individuals for speech‑adjacent conduct.

Broader internet regulation and borders

  • Comparisons drawn to GDPR, US state “online safety” and age‑verification laws, and porn regulation: all rely on extraterritorial claims or geoblocking.
  • Some say hosting a global site is inherently “speaking across borders” and comes with responsibilities to respect foreign rules; others insist each country should regulate its own citizens and traffic (block locally) rather than conscripting foreign hosts.
  • Underneath is a deeper anxiety: the Internet drifting toward national firewalls and fragmented “bordered” networks, with free speech protections eroded by converging Western and non‑Western censorship norms.

Practical reactions and realism

  • Several operators state they will pre‑emptively block UK IPs, refuse UK customers, and avoid UK travel to sidestep risk.
  • Others point out that, while ignoring Ofcom may be legally safe inside the US, it restricts travel due to possible extradition or arrest in third countries.
  • Some view the lawyer’s tone as combative and legally muddled; others say a hard‑line, absolutist posture is exactly what’s needed to deter future extraterritorial censorship attempts.