Redmond, WA, turns off Flock Safety cameras after ICE arrests

Surveillance vs. Safety Tradeoffs

• Core disagreement: some see automated license plate readers (ALPRs) as reasonable tools to solve serious crimes and improve public safety; others see any mass, persistent tracking as inherently incompatible with a free society.
• Several comments stress that everyone draws a line somewhere; the conflict is about where, not whether, to trade privacy for safety.
• Opponents argue there is effectively “no line” once data is collected: mission creep and repurposing for new uses are inevitable.

From “Serious Crime Only” to “Salami Tactics”

• Many see this as a textbook case of tools introduced for grave crimes (murder, kidnapping) being extended to lesser offenses and then to politically driven enforcement (e.g., immigration).
• This “salami-slicing” pattern is described as well-known and entirely foreseeable, not an “unintended consequence.”

ICE, Federal Power, and Local Resistance

• Debate over why immigration enforcement became the red line:
  • Critics say people were fine with the dragnet until it hit sympathetic groups (undocumented workers, “brown people”).
  • Others frame it as a state–federal power struggle: Washington law limits local cooperation with immigration enforcement, and Flock’s architecture undermines that.
• Some call ICE behavior itself unlawful or abusive and argue cities have no obligation to assist.

Public Records Ruling and Legal Tension

• A Skagit County ruling that Flock images are public records is seen as a major driver: if data is “public,” anyone (including ICE or criminals) can request it.
• Commenters note Washington’s public-records rules and previous FOIA “DDoS” episodes with police bodycam footage, leading to redaction burdens and legislative limits.

Expectation of Privacy in Public

• Strong thread arguing that traditional “no expectation of privacy in public” doctrine breaks down with dense, networked cameras and AI search.
• Others counter that government-funded cameras in public spaces should produce public data, similar to NASA imagery, and that access can be constrained by warrant requirements.

Flock Safety’s Conduct and Trust

• Multiple posts call Flock an untrustworthy actor: incomplete transparency listings, workarounds for local data restrictions, and a founder vision of “eliminating all crime.”
• An ex-employee describes sales tactics that deliberately route around legal limits by using HOAs and businesses as data collectors, then sharing with agencies.

Public Sentiment and Resistance

• Reports from various regions: some residents and HOAs eagerly adopt Flock or share Ring footage, viewing critics as paranoid or “having something to hide.”
• Others describe bipartisan grassroots hostility, vandalism and “creative” disabling of cameras, and tools like deflock.me to map and oppose deployments.
• A minority of voices emphasize concrete successes (e.g., a local murder solved quickly using Flock), arguing that critics ignore real investigative value.