The Department of War just shot the accountants and opted for speed

Moral unease and deterrence

• Several commenters express discomfort with “more weapons faster,” questioning whether lethal tools can ever be used “humanely and morally.”
• Others argue fewer, clearly deterrent nuclear weapons could be better than huge conventional arsenals, but pushback notes nukes only deter existential, attributable attacks—not terrorism, cyberwar, or proxy conflicts.
• There’s concern that as unmanned systems replace soldiers, the political cost of using force drops, making war easier to start.

Move-fast procurement vs safety and accountability

• Many see the reforms as “move fast and break things” applied to warfighting, which they find dangerous when failures equal dead pilots and soldiers.
• Some with acquisition experience say the article overstates what’s new: COTS preference, trading cost/schedule/performance, MOSA, and OTAs have existed for years and are still constrained by FAR/DFAR and statute.
• Others warn that bypassing traditional oversight mainly lowers friction for grift and war profiteering, comparing to DOGE-style schemes or prior scandals like “Fat Leonard.”

Good-enough vs best-in-class; drones and mass production

• One camp insists the U.S. should buy only “best-in-class” systems; another argues simple, “good-enough” weapons that can be mass-produced (e.g., FPV drones) are often more decisive.
• Ukraine is repeatedly cited: some say drones only fill an artillery gap; others (including a self-identified Ukrainian) argue drones have become central across tactical and strategic roles.
• Historical examples (Sherman vs King Tiger, WWII production, artillery shell shortages) support the view that quantity and manufacturability matter as much as peak performance.

Bureaucracy, corruption, and institutional decay

• Commenters agree current acquisition is bloated and slow, but disagree whether bureaucracy mainly protects against corruption or has become corruption itself.
• DoD’s chronic failure to complete an audit is cited as evidence that real financial control is already weak.
• Several predict that loosening rules now, under an administration already associated with family-linked contracts and politicized branding, will supercharge patronage and fraud rather than agility.

Politics, naming, and adversaries

• The use of “Department of War” and rebranded domains is seen by many as partisan signaling and authoritarian flex, not mere semantics; legally, it remains the Department of Defense.
• Views on threat vary: some describe China as an undeniable adversary and argue the U.S. is already in a kind of WW3; others see the entire framing as war propaganda from a country that itself destabilizes much of the world.