Digital ID, a new way to create and present an ID in Apple Wallet

Scope and international context

• Feature is US‑centric (passports, selected state driver’s licenses); not usable for US citizens abroad or most of the world yet.
• Several commenters note other countries (e.g., Poland, Romania, EU) already have government‑run digital IDs that work across services (driving, taxes, voting, prescriptions).
• Some prefer government‑provided, open‑source, decentralized eID systems (e.g., Switzerland, EU digital ID) over platform‑controlled IDs from private US tech firms.

Adoption, legal status, and everyday use

• Many want all US states’ driver’s licenses in Wallet and legal requirements that any entity requesting ID must accept digital versions.
• Others insist on keeping a physical card so they can leave phones at home and avoid being “forced digital.”
• Practical issues: many retailers, agencies, and even police in states with digital IDs still reject them or prefer plastic cards.

Privacy, surveillance, and slippery‑slope concerns

• Strong worry that digital IDs, combined with digital payments, smartphone‑only transport, and facial recognition, accelerate loss of privacy and increase tracking.
• Fears include: future mandates to carry ID at all times, digital‑only IDs, tying IDs to social media accounts, and more ID checks once verification is “frictionless.”
• Supporters argue US political culture resists national ID and mandatory carry; skeptics counter with examples of growing ID requirements and surveillance.

Phone vs physical ID and police interactions

• Multiple people refuse to ever hand a phone to police, citing risk of searches, coercion to unlock, or confiscation.
• Others note Apple’s design: tap‑to‑reader, no device handover or full unlock required, and selective disclosure (e.g., just age).
• Critics respond that this depends on actual field practices: officers may lack working readers, demand unlocked phones, or treat digital‑only users differently.

Technical and security discussion

• Commenters discuss reading passport NFC chips with phones, Basic Access Control using MRZ data, and signed data blobs rather than zero‑knowledge proofs.
• Debate over whether digital IDs truly prevent forgery versus merely shifting attack surfaces (e.g., screens mimicking passes, QR misuse).
• Some see digital IDs as adding convenience and reducing bureaucracy; others emphasize new centralization and attack surfaces on opaque, proprietary devices.

Broader societal implications

• Concerns about “perfect” or frictionless enforcement freezing social change and enabling more pervasive control (e.g., age‑gated activities, medicine, online speech).
• Facial recognition at airports and touchless TSA lanes are seen by some as great convenience and by others as normalization of biometric surveillance.