Britain's railway privatization was an abject failure

Privatization success stories and counterexamples

• Several commenters cite successful or mixed privatizations: Japanese rail (high farebox recovery, expansion, real-estate revenues), EU telecoms, airlines, Canada’s CN Rail, some PPP transit projects in Canada and the US, and parts of UK telecoms and aviation (BT, BA, Rolls-Royce).
• Others argue these are partial or sector-specific: telecoms and airlines are competitive markets, unlike “natural monopolies” such as rail, water, and power networks.
• Some note that even where privatization “works”, it often does so with heavy regulation, subsidies, or state shareholding.

Japanese rail as a contested model

• Pro‑privatization points: very high cost recovery, dense and frequent service, integrated stations+malls, and diversified rail companies capturing land value.
• Critiques: extreme crowding and safety concerns during rush hour, sexual harassment, lack of platform barriers in key stations, awkward inter-operator transfers, and high residual car priority in cities.
• Debate over causes of quality: strong unions and labor protections, cultural pride and maintenance norms, and demographic decline reducing peak demand.

UK rail privatization: costs, structure, and safety

• Many UK-based commenters describe rail as operationally “usable” but extremely expensive, especially intercity and peak commuting; coaches or cars are often cheaper.
• Fragmentation creates absurdities (multiple operators on same line with incompatible tickets, complex pricing, separate rolling-stock companies extracting large profits).
• Track and signalling are now renationalized (Network Rail); train operators are tightly controlled franchises with limited real autonomy.
• Safety data: absolute fatalities spiked early post‑privatization, but deaths per km travelled fell; one cited statistical review finds no clear evidence that privatization worsened safety, others counter that renationalized infrastructure coincides with later improvements.

Comparisons with Europe and beyond

• Experiences elsewhere are mixed: Swiss rail is widely praised; German DB seen as deteriorated; Dutch and Italian systems have elements of competition on state-owned infrastructure; Hong Kong’s MTR and some Czech private operators are cited as high-performing.
• Several note that UK rail looks good on frequency and network reach, but badly on affordability and project delivery (HS2 as emblematic failure).

Natural monopolies, subsidies, and governance

• Strong thread arguing that infrastructure monopolies (rail, water, power, broadband last‑mile) are poor candidates for profit-driven ownership: unavoidable services, limited competition, and inevitable public backstops (“privatize profits, socialize losses”).
• Others stress that governance quality and regulation matter more than ownership form; the UK is criticized as unusually bad at contracting, regulating, and long‑term planning.
• PPP and PFI in the UK (schools, hospitals, some transport) are often described as off‑balance-sheet borrowing that proved more expensive and opaque with construction-quality issues.

Ideology and evidence

• Multiple comments flag the Rosa Luxemburg foundation as an explicitly left-wing source; some see that as disqualifying, others note all sources have political angles.
• Disputes over which metrics define “success”: ridership growth vs ticket prices, subsidy levels, safety per passenger‑km, wider economic benefits, and long-term institutional competence.