Disney Lost Roger Rabbit

Overall reaction to the article

  • Many readers found it clear, enjoyable, and an effective explanation of how copyright has drifted from its stated purpose, especially around creative labor and media monopolies.
  • Others thought Doctorow’s rhetoric overstated powerlessness (“forced” contracts, “no alternatives”) and disliked some analogies as misleading or overly class-framed.

Termination of Transfer and creator leverage

  • Strong support for 35‑year “Termination of Transfer” as one of the few copyright tools that clearly benefits creators, since it can’t be permanently signed away.
  • Counterpoint: waiting 35 years feels like “half a lifetime” and more like a symbolic fix; suggestions ranged from ~10–20 years or back to the original 14+14 model.
  • Some argue termination probably doesn’t dramatically lower upfront payments, since the NPV of income after 35 years is tiny and companies work around it with bundled deals.

Roger Rabbit specifics and limits

  • Excitement that the original author regained rights; some hope for a new “Roger Rabbit universe.”
  • Several point out legal and practical constraints:
    • Disney (and others) almost certainly own the movie character designs and specific visual incarnations.
    • Spielberg reportedly must approve any new Roger content.
    • The film was a multi‑studio “lightning in a bottle” collaboration unlikely to be replicated.
  • Some note the novel and film differ heavily; even with rights back, the author may only freely exploit the book’s incarnation, not Disney’s.

Other IP control examples & “ashcan” works

  • Dick Tracy, Star Wars merchandising, Wheel of Time, Fantastic Four (1994), Universal’s Marvel land: all cited as examples of rights being hoarded or minimally exercised (“ashcan” / “placeholder” productions) just to preserve control.
  • Debate over whether this behavior is rational IP stewardship or just petty gatekeeping that harms audiences and creators.

Abandonware and games

  • Question raised whether old game developers could reclaim rights; general answer: only if they weren’t work‑for‑hire and held the original copyright.
  • Japan’s government licensing mechanism for reissuing abandonware (with escrowed royalties) cited as an alternative model.

Market power, alternatives, and self‑publishing

  • Doctorow’s monopsony framing (5 publishers, 4 studios, etc.) resonated with many, including for app stores.
  • Critics respond that creators aren’t literally forced: they can shop around or self‑publish, and some have succeeded that way—though others argue the alternatives are often weak and discoverability is still dominated by a few platforms.

Copyright scope, term, and philosophy

  • Calls ranged from modest shortening (e.g., fixed 50 years) to drastic cuts (~10 years) or returning to 14+14 with renewal reserved to creators.
  • Disagreement over whether shorter terms would boost or reduce investment in new works, and whether consolidation would worsen or improve.
  • Several note that current ultra‑long terms mainly benefit large catalog owners, not working creators, and also restrict new creators’ ability to draw on the cultural commons.

AI, media cartels, and creators

  • Some see media lawsuits against AI firms as primarily rent‑seeking: big publishers want to own a new “AI training right” and then sell it to AI companies, further marginalizing artists.
  • Others hope large rights holders might, even inadvertently, establish legal precedents that protect all creators from unlicensed training.
  • Separate debate highlights that entertainment conglomerates are currently a bigger, more concrete threat to creators than AI, though generative AI may exacerbate discoverability problems and flood markets with standardized “slop.”

Nature of IP and rights alienation

  • Ongoing thread on whether copyright should be alienable like physical property, or more like an inalienable “author’s right” (with only usage licensed), as in some civil‑law countries.
  • Some argue creators should never be able to fully sign away core rights, to prevent systematic exploitation; others insist transferability is essential to financing and exploiting works at scale.