DOE gives Microsoft partner $1B loan to restart Three Mile Island reactor

Status of the Three Mile Island site

• Commenters clarify that only Unit 2 melted down; Unit 1 (the one being restarted) ran normally until 2019 and was originally scheduled for decommissioning decades from now.
• TMI is not “uninhabitable”; cleanup and containment have long been deemed sufficient by regulators.
• Comparisons are made to Chernobyl, where other units kept operating for years after the accident.

Economics of the restart & Microsoft’s role

• The plant was shut in 2019 mainly for cost reasons; now a 20‑year capacity purchase by Microsoft plus rapidly rising electricity demand changes the math.
• Analysts cited in the article estimate Microsoft paying ~$110/MWh, which several commenters note is above median estimates for new solar or wind plus storage but may be acceptable for a hyperscaler that values 24/7 availability and PR around nuclear.
• Some point out that the cost of lost GPU utilization dwarfs modest premiums on electricity.

Nuclear vs renewables: cost, reliability, and data centers

• Debate over whether solar+storage is cheaper than nuclear for 24/7 supply: one side cites Lazard numbers showing overlapping cost ranges and argues renewables plus storage are already cheaper; others argue integration, multi‑day storage, and backup are undercounted.
• Reliability is contested: nuclear has high average capacity factors (over 90% in the US, lower in France), but critics highlight long planned outages and multi‑month unplanned ones, arguing you still need fossil or other backup.
• Some speculate about “interruptible” AI workloads following cheap intermittent power, but others stress the capital waste of idle GPUs.

New build vs refurbishment and “learning”

• Refurbishing TMI Unit 1 (~$1.6B) is seen as far cheaper and faster than a greenfield reactor, with rough estimates of $5–15B for new large units in the US.
• There’s disagreement on whether scale and repetition would drive nuclear costs down; one side cites “negative learning” historical data, the other blames ever‑tightening regulation and one‑off designs.

Policy, regulation, and DOE loan authority

• Multiple comments note the loan comes via the DOE Loan Programs Office, created by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and expanded by the Inflation Reduction Act’s Energy Infrastructure Reinvestment program; Congress explicitly authorized these loans.
• Several argue most nuclear cost is in permitting, regulatory changes mid‑build, and litigation, not hardware.
• Others counter that finance prefers predictable, fast‑to‑build renewables whose costs are clearly falling.

Fuel supply and geopolitics

• A confusion about US uranium reserves is corrected; the US has significant reserves and close allies (e.g., Australia) with very large ones.
• Broader discussion: some see dependence on imported solar/battery supply chains—heavily centered in China—as a bigger strategic risk than nuclear fuel imports.
• Others argue cheap Chinese solar is effectively a large subsidy to the West and accelerates decarbonization, even if it hollowed out local manufacturing.

Why a federal loan instead of Microsoft cash

• Some note that even a cash‑rich company prefers cheap or risk‑sharing government loans and may want to avoid being fully exposed if the operator fails.
• Others point out that government loans can be at rates above Treasury, potentially netting taxpayers a return.

Aging plant technology and maintenance

• One commenter with industry experience notes that old plants may face high costs for custom replacement parts and archaic control systems.
• Another clarifies a technical detail (neon vs incandescent indicators), but consensus is that regulatory overhead dominates operating economics.