2025-11-22

The Pentagon Can't Trust GPS Anymore

Access to the Article

Ukraine “Peace Deal”, Pentagon, and US Government Trust

Thread quickly pivots from GPS to a heated debate about a reported US-backed Ukraine “deal,” seen by many as originating from or aligned with Russian interests.
Critics call it a capitulation: Ukraine gives up occupied and additional territory, reduces its military, loses sanctions leverage on Russia, and faces a higher risk of future attacks with fewer defenses.
They argue it betrays prior security assurances (e.g., related to Ukraine giving up nuclear weapons) and signals that US/NATO guarantees are unreliable, potentially encouraging Chinese moves on Taiwan.
Defenders frame it as pragmatic: the US doesn’t want endless spending or escalation; peace and economic rebuilding are prioritized over punitive logic, which they see as having failed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Gaza.
Strong pushback counters this with “appeasement” analogies and distrust of Russian compliance, asserting that any pause just lets Russia regroup.
Debate broadens into mutual accusations of “whataboutism” over Western vs Russian war crimes, with disagreement on whether equal accountability is realistic or used as a distraction.
Some discuss a hypothetical US–Russia alignment against China; others call it unrealistic given Russia’s regime, dependence on China, and internal weakness.

GPS Vulnerability, Spoofing, and Military Navigation

Core technical point: the concern is not lack of satellites but vulnerability to jamming/spoofing, increasingly visible in Ukraine.
Some ask why this wasn’t designed out from the start; others reply it was foreseen, with long-standing anti-jam research, encrypted military codes (e.g., M-code), and GPS/INS hybrid guidance.
Acknowledged issues: legacy receivers are weak, doctrine grew over-reliant on GPS after decades of dominance, and near-peer conflicts may force improvisation with cheaper, less resilient systems.
Newer GPS features (directional spot beams with ~+20 dB gain) improve jamming resistance but don’t help existing, older munitions already fielded.

Alternative and Complementary PNT Systems

Several links detail US policy work on “timing resilience,” including a roadmap and R&D plans.
Many advocate resurrecting LORAN/eLoran as a robust, low-frequency, continent-scale backup; examples cited where South Korea, China, and European partners are already deploying such networks.
Others note LORAN-like systems are mainly useful near friendly territory and don’t directly solve deep-strike targeting against China.
Discussion includes the idea of exploiting adversaries’ own PNT systems (e.g., China’s BeiDou and Loran) but acknowledges both sides likely plan for this and for countermeasures.

Comparison with Other GNSS (Galileo, BeiDou, etc.)

Commenters state that European and Chinese systems are architecturally similar to GPS, sharing its strengths and core vulnerabilities; differences are mostly in coverage and implementation, not fundamental resilience.

Civil and Aviation Resilience Without GPS

One commenter describes asking an approach-control facility what happens if GPS dies “permanently” and perceiving no clear plan.
Another, more optimistic, notes that IFR pre-dates GPS: VOR-based routes, non-GPS precision approaches, and regulatory proficiency requirements give aviation substantial non-GPS fallback, though workload and efficiency would suffer.

Military Use and History of GPS

Clarified that GPS is a US military system with encrypted signals and higher-accuracy service for military users; civilians get unencrypted signals.
Selective degradation for civilians ended in 2000, explaining today’s high civilian accuracy.
Historical notes: GPS was built in the 1970s, publicly promised for civil use in the 1980s, and dramatically demonstrated in Desert Storm.

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