Japan's gamble to turn island of Hokkaido into global chip hub

Geopolitical risk and Hokkaido’s defensibility

  • One camp argues Hokkaido and Japan are future war zones: citing Soviet seizure of the Kurils, Russian interest in Hokkaido, and Chinese rhetoric around Okinawa and Taiwan.
  • Others push back strongly: Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and navy are seen as far more capable than Russia’s, amphibious invasion across water is logistically brutal, and a US‑Japan treaty plus US nuclear deterrent make a Russian or Chinese attack on Japan extremely unlikely.
  • Several note that if China ever “solved” Taiwan by force, escalation to Japan/Korea would likely mean a broader world war, so the discussion is somewhat hypothetical.

China’s intentions: Taiwan vs Japan/Korea

  • A detailed “Chinese perspective” says Taiwan is treated as an internal civil‑war issue due to shared ethnicity and history, whereas Japan and South Korea are targets for economic outperformance, not annexation.
  • Many respondents are unconvinced: Tibet/Xinjiang, the South China Sea, India/Bhutan border clashes, and harassment of Vietnamese/Filipino fishing boats are cited as evidence of a broader expansionist pattern.
  • There is extended debate over Taiwan’s status: PRC/ROC civil‑war framing vs. Taiwan as a de facto sovereign democracy whose population overwhelmingly does not want PRC rule; self‑determination vs. “unfinished civil war” claims.

Historical claims: Okinawa/Ryukyu and borders

  • Long subthread on whether Chinese references to Ryukyu/Okinawa’s tributary past are harmless propaganda or groundwork for future territorial claims.
  • Some emphasize post‑WWII agreements and historical ties to China; others counter that tribute was trade/diplomacy, not sovereignty, and liken the narrative to Russian justifications in Crimea/Donbas.
  • Consensus in the thread is that Okinawa should remain Japanese today, but history is used opportunistically by all sides.

Seismic vs political concentration risk

  • Multiple comments note the irony of global chip capacity clustering in politically threatened Taiwan and seismically active Hokkaido.
  • Others argue Japan and Taiwan already engineer for frequent quakes; recent quakes have disrupted production but not catastrophically.

Europe’s semiconductor angst

  • Many European commenters express envy at Japan’s bold, state‑backed push and lament EU incrementalism, over‑regulation, and reliance on legacy nodes.
  • ASML and some European fabs (e.g. STMicro) are acknowledged, but there’s concern about losing high‑margin segments to US and Asia, mirroring broader industrial decline fears.

Hokkaido as a place to build and live

  • Several describe Hokkaido as spacious, beautiful, and under‑industrialized: good transport (airport, planned Shinkansen), strong agriculture, but historically lacking high‑tech jobs.
  • Fabs are seen as a chance to anchor a new industry, draw internal migrants from Tokyo/Osaka, and rebalance Japan away from Tokyo‑centric development, though demographics and labor supply remain open questions.