EU Council Approves New "Chat Control" Mandate Pushing Mass Surveillance

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Scope and “Voluntary” Scanning

  • Many see the “voluntary” scanning as de facto mandatory: services judged “high risk” (anonymous use, media uploads, encryption) will face serious liability if they don’t scan and something bad is later found.
  • Commenters argue that “voluntary but with repercussions” is indistinguishable from a legal mandate; likened to coerced “consent.”
  • A minority argues critics are over-reading the text and that technical obligations don’t automatically become legal obligations; they see this draft as less bad than the original E2E backdoor proposal.

Privacy, Security, and UX Trade-offs

  • Strong push toward open-source, decentralized, and P2P messengers (Tox, SimpleX, Element, XMPP, Matrix, overlay networks, mesh networks).
  • Others stress usability: non-technical users often prefer polished, centralized apps (iMessage, WhatsApp, Signal); nerd-favourite tools frequently fail mainstream UX expectations.
  • Signal is seen as a pragmatic choice but criticized for centralization, Linux support gaps, and backup UX; some note Signal has said it would leave the EU rather than scan, but trust is conditional.
  • Several warn that criminals and state actors will just use illegal or steganographic encryption, so mass scanning mainly harms ordinary users.

EU Process, Democracy, and Legitimacy

  • Multiple comments clarify this is not law yet: Council has adopted a negotiating position; Parliament still must vote, then possible court review (ECJ, ECHR, national constitutional courts like Germany’s).
  • Others say the real problem is structural: complex, slow, opaque processes that citizens and media can’t track, making the EU a “political laundering” machine for unpopular laws.
  • Debate over whether EU institutions are genuinely democratic or effectively insulated elites appointed via national governments; some distinguish Council vs Parliament and stress member states themselves drive this.

Comparisons and Broader Surveillance Trend

  • UK often cited as already worse (Online Safety Act, ID/face upload to access sites, “non-crime hate incidents,” arrests for social media posts); some say Brexit only removed EU-level checks.
  • Several argue mass surveillance is already de facto reality via big tech, KYC/AML, ID checks, and CSAM databases; this just formalizes it.
  • Others highlight global convergence: US age-verification and digital ID, corporate biometric verification, and AI voice impersonation prompting tighter security.

Motivations, Lobbying, and Politics

  • Strong suspicion of corporate lobbying, especially surveillance/analytics vendors (Palantir, similar firms) who stand to profit from mandated scanning infrastructure.
  • Some see “for the children” as a recurring pretext for expanding state power and normalizing censorship and monitoring.
  • Frustration with politicians and parties is widespread; some threaten to support EU-exit or fringe/libertarian parties as punishment, while others warn populist “alternatives” often become equally or more authoritarian.