Airbus A320 – intense solar radiation may corrupt data critical for flight

Incident and Scope of the Airbus Action

  • Discussion links the fleet action to JetBlue 1230 on Oct 30: a sudden uncommanded pitch-down, injuries, and emergency diversion.
  • European regulators describe a vulnerability where an ELAC (Elevator Aileron Computer) fault could command elevator movement strong enough to risk structural limits.
  • Not all A320-family aircraft are affected; only a subset with specific ELAC hardware/firmware combinations.
  • Fix appears to be a software rollback to an earlier ELAC version plus added error checking and automatic restart of the failing component.

Radiation Type and Likely Mechanism

  • Commenters converge on “cosmic rays / solar particle events” (single-event upsets) rather than ordinary sunlight.
  • A coronal mass ejection or elevated geomagnetic activity is suspected, but exact event–flight correlation is unclear.
  • High-altitude aircraft are acknowledged to see much more radiation than ground systems; some argue they should be closer to space-grade “rad-hard” design.

Hardware vs Software Fix and SEU Mitigation

  • Some are uneasy that a software change is addressing what appears to be a hardware susceptibility.
  • Others note software can add redundancy (multiple copies, checksums, self-supervision, watchdogs, automatic restart) and is a valid way to turn silent data corruption into detectable failures.
  • Thread references traditional measures: ECC/EDAC, triple modular redundancy, voting logic, lockstep CPUs, disabling caches, memory scrubbing, and rad-hard components.

Redundancy, Legacy Designs, and Certification Constraints

  • Older Airbus flight computers and ADIRUs were designed in the 1990s, sometimes without EDAC; later variants added it.
  • Multiple independent computers and sensor triplexing are used so a single erroneous unit can be outvoted or rejected, but past incidents show algorithmic edge cases where two bad sensors can dominate.
  • Strong motivation to reuse certified hardware and software for decades; changing flight computers triggers expensive recertification and complex pilot training issues, so evolution is incremental.

Operational, Safety, and Perception Issues

  • Groundings have caused missed connections, overnight stays, and significant disruption; passengers are told planes need a software update, which some find unsettling.
  • Several argue immediate grounding is rational risk management and reputational protection, especially contrasted with Boeing’s history.
  • Commenters emphasize wearing seatbelts at all times due to unpredictable turbulence and control issues.
  • Some skepticism remains about whether radiation alone explains an issue apparently unique to this specific ELAC version; EMI or design regressions are suggested but unresolved.