Modern cars are spying on you. Here's what you can do about it

Surveillance Ecosystem, Not Just Cars

• Commenters broaden the concern from cars to e‑scooters, Ring doorbells, and especially ALPR systems like Flock, which are already used to track protests and everyday movement.
• Some argue that once data exists in any database, governments can and will access it, legally or otherwise.
• Others point out that license plates and systems like TPMS (tire-pressure sensors broadcasting unique IDs) already enable mass tracking, regardless of telematics.

Legal and Regulatory Context

• Massachusetts’ right‑to‑repair law led some manufacturers to disable telematics there, but federal regulators later told automakers not to comply, citing safety and remote‑hacking risks.
• In the EU, mandatory eCall and new cybersecurity rules effectively require always‑on modems, making it hard or illegal to fully disable connectivity, even though privacy protections exist on paper.
• Several people think governments quietly favor car tracking and that regulators are aligning with manufacturers.

Practical Countermeasures and Their Limits

• Common suggestions: remove or unplug telematics modules, SIM cards, or antennas (often in the “shark fin” or overhead console); use dummy loads on antenna ports; run offline navigation via phones or standalone GPS; avoid Android Auto/CarPlay; or buy older, pre‑connected cars.
• Others report this is increasingly hard: shared boards, backup antennas, tied-in microphones/speakers, DTC errors, and even roadworthiness/TPMS rules. Some mechanics refuse to touch modems.
• One owner describes MITM‑filtering CAN traffic from a Miata’s telematics unit, but fears upcoming encrypted/secured CAN will block such workarounds.
• A few advocate intentionally poisoning telemetry data, but there’s extended debate that this might violate the CFAA and be treated as “damage” to someone else’s system.

Trade‑offs: Safety, Convenience, and Privacy

• Some posters advise radical minimization: turn phones off, avoid modern features, ignore non‑critical warnings, use bikes or car‑free lifestyles. Others argue this is unrealistic or unsafe, especially in car‑dependent US regions.
• Modern safety and driver-assistance features (TPMS, AEB, lane-keep, remote start, crash emergency calls) are defended as real benefits; opponents see them as marginal gains used to justify intrusive data collection and owner lock‑in.
• Several anecdotes show telemetry already used against owners (warranty denials, precise mileage via Carvana, remote‑feature gating on data consent), reinforcing distrust.