Hunting for North Korean Fiber Optic Cables
North Korean Internet & Intelligence Operations
- Early experiences probing DPRK infrastructure found strong perimeter firewalls and quick incident response, making intranet access via compromised public servers difficult.
- Leaked NSA tooling and documents mention targeting North Korean antivirus (Silivaccine) and Red Star OS, suggesting past penetration but likely increasing hardening over time.
- Commenters generally assume NSA and others have had some access but see DPRK as a particularly challenging environment for long-term, stealthy operations.
Endpoints, Remote Access, and User Software
- Discussion of client-side tools:
- “Netkey”/“Oconnect” reportedly required for domestic network access.
- “Hangro” described as a VPN-like system allowing external users to connect back into DPRK for messaging.
- It remains unclear whether any endpoints simultaneously bridge intranet and full internet, but such dual-homed systems are seen as a prime theoretical vector.
Mobile Networks and Tourist Access
- One claim: three mobile networks (citizen, government/military, and tourist-only), with the tourist network having internet connectivity via special SIMs.
- A traveler disputes this, reporting only voice calls from Pyongyang hotels and highly restricted data access, with one casino terminal in Rason as a rare internet outlet.
- Overall status of tourist mobile internet is left as uncertain.
IPv4 Space, Routing, and Politics
- DPRK’s small visible IPv4 space (about 1,024 addresses) is attributed to limited need for externally reachable infrastructure rather than inability to obtain more.
- Multiple comments explain that IPv4 is still obtainable via RIR policies, transfers, or leases; national actors could get more if desired.
- Routing patterns are seen as largely driven by geography (land borders with China/Russia, rail/road fiber corridors) but also aligned with political relationships.
Fiber Optic Deployment & Railroad Evidence
- Several comments affirm that small trackside boxes are compatible with fiber: modern fiber tolerates tight bend radii, and modest enclosures suffice for splices.
- Burying fiber is viewed as more work upfront but more robust than aerial deployment (less exposure to weather, animals, and “flying backhoes”).
- Running fiber along rail rights-of-way is considered standard practice globally.
- One commenter finds the article’s railroad-based inference weak, arguing true repeater sites should be larger and that the photos could just show generic railway equipment.
Cyber Operations & Regime Context
- Posters debate why DPRK appears prominent in cybercrime:
- Some emphasize pariah status, sanctions, and the regime’s need for hard currency, which lower the cost of engaging in criminal hacking.
- Others argue most large states could do similar things but refrain due to reputational and legal constraints.
- Disagreement over the degree of coercion vs incentive (e.g., “do this or your family suffers” vs simply offering relatively high local wages).
- There is skepticism that DPRK hackers are uniquely “elite”; some see them more as well-resourced scammers and APT operators, comparable to other state or tolerated-criminal groups.
Historical and Moral Debates
- Long, contentious subthread on:
- Responsibility for DPRK’s current state (US bombing and partition vs DPRK leadership and Soviet/Chinese roles).
- Whether more aggressive US action in Korea or against China/USSR (including hypothetical nuclear use) would have prevented later suffering or instead led to far greater catastrophe.
- Comparisons between DPRK’s internal atrocities and US-led wars abroad, with some arguing Western crimes receive too little scrutiny.
- No consensus emerges; positions range from viewing DPRK as a uniquely egregious failure of humanity to seeing it as one example among many great-power-inflicted tragedies.
Miscellaneous
- One commenter notes that North Korea’s national standard (KPS 9566) contributed several Unicode emojis, including hot beverage, umbrella with rain, and lightning bolt.